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“Learn from your mistakes.” “Adversity makes us stronger.” “There are no 
obstacles, only challenges.” We all know the clichés, right? And, probably 
more often than we want to admit, we feel a twinge of annoyance every time 
we hear them. 
And yet, the whole purpose of this journal is to provide you, the CT profes-
sional, with a forum where you can share lessons learned or, perhaps, ponder 
the aftermath of lessons unlearned or never learned. Throughout the warfare 
that has been such a large part of human history, whether we like it or not, 
very often it’s what we messed up that teaches us what we need to know. 
This issue of CTX looks at what went wrong, or at least not as right as it should 
have gone, on some very diverse battlefields. COL Imre Porkoláb launches the 
discussion with a detailed look at Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan in 2002. 
As envisioned by the command HQ several hundred miles away, this operation 
should have been a simple matter of ’coptering in and taking a valley called 
Shah-i-Khot from a few scattered remnants of the enemy. As many of you 
know, that’s not what happened. Porkoláb uses the near-disaster of Anaconda 
to highlight one unconventional officer’s courageous leadership, and suggests 
that role models like him are vital for future SOF training.
MAJ Greg Merkl leads us through the math of societal breakdown caused by 
floods of well-meaning development money, sent into dusty rural hamlets 
from another culture a universe away. Those of you who have seen the ways in 
which Afghanistan has changed—and not changed—over the past decade will 
appreciate the author’s ironic sense of humor.
The Estonian Forest Brothers’ resistance movement defied Soviet occupation 
during and immediately after WWII, only to succumb to Soviet infiltration as 
its weak organizational structure, initially a strength, became a liability. In two 
articles covering two major periods of the Forest Brothers’ activity, CPT Olavi 
Punga and COL Martin Herem take advantage of newly accessible Soviet 
archives to analyze the lessons this little known piece of history offers for CT 
professionals who face a similarly decentralized enemy.
Alongside the development money described by MAJ Merkl, there’s another 
flood of money going into Afghanistan, this one directly into the hands of the 
Taliban. What the world gets in exchange, thanks to a network of PKK smug-
glers, is several tons of cheap, high-grade heroin every year. LTC Kashif Khan 
and Chief Inspector Olcay Er take us on a tour of this terrorist financing 
pipeline, from the farms of Afghanistan through the processing labs located 
near porous borders, and onto the street corners of Europe. 
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Human rights are central to any discussion of insurgency. From many years’ experience combating the Colombian 
insurgent group know as the FARC, LTC Jorge Galindo Cardenas opens his readers’ eyes to the ways in which even 
those who champion the cause of human rights can become unwitting pawns in the insurgents’ efforts to gain political 
legitimacy.
This issue’s CTAP interview has LTC Kashif Khan speaking with LTC (and MD) Ramey Wilson about Wilson’s 
training and experiences in the U.S. Army medical corps. Wilson shares his thoughts on how U.S. medical teams are 
adapting their strategy to the requirements of remote, austere, and hostile territories. He also discusses ways in which 
the United States can and should assist other countries to develop their medical capabilities and make the best use 
of limited resources under combat and post-combat conditions. When you send people to risk their lives in far-away 
places, he emphasizes, they have to know that the resources are in place to take care of them when they get hurt.
George Lober returns to the Ethics and Insights column with a thoughtful exploration of the responsibilities individ-
uals bear to maintain a personal code of ethics, even when subordinated to an organization that demands conformity 
and obedience. If you surrender your rights to life and liberty when you “sign on the dotted line” of a military career, 
do you also give up the right to pass moral judgment on orders and missions that violate your personal code of honor?
We have no movie or book reviews from our readers this time. C’mon, folks, send ’em in! Here is a relatively  
painless, and actually pretty fun, way to get your name and opinions in print. Have you seen a great World War II 
movie? Tell the rest of us, so we can watch it, too! Have you wasted your time on a good-sounding book that missed 
the mark? Help your fellow CT professionals avoid the same fate by describing where it went wrong. Without  
your contributions we wouldn’t have a journal, so keep writing, and when you have something you like, send it to 
ctxsubmit@globalecco.org.
We also want to hear from you about the journal itself. Do you like what you’re reading? Do you know how we could 
do better? Is there an article or column that really got you thinking or talking? We welcome all your feedback, positive 
and negative. Write a letter to the editor at ctxeditor@globalecco.org.
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Chief Inspector Olcay Er graduated from the Turkish Police 
Academy as a lieutenant in 2002. He worked in the police 
department and homicide division in Mersin, the Criminal 
Police Laboratory in Ankara, and for the Consulate General of 
Turkey located in Houston, Texas. He completed his Master of 
Science degree in Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) in June 2013. His next duty assignment will be as 
superintendent of the Police Academy in Ankara.
Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Galindo Cardenas has more than 
20 years of active service as an infantry officer in the Colom-
bian Army. He graduated with a master’s degree in Defense 
Analysis from NPS in June 2013. Prior to that, he attended the 
Colombian Command and General Staff College, where he was 
recognized as a distinguished graduate. LTC Galindo has held 
command positions at every rank from platoon commander to 
battalion commander. Prior to his most recent promotion, LTC 
Galindo served as chief of security for the Colombian minister 
of defense, advising government leaders on national security 
and strategic issues.
Colonel Martin Herem has served as an Army officer in the 
Estonian Defense Forces since 1992. He has been a platoon 
leader, company commander, staff officer, instructor in tactics 
at the Estonian National Defense College (ENDC), and com-
mander of a military region (a territorial infantry brigade). In 
2006, COL Herem served as a force protection officer with a 
U.S. brigade in OIF II. COL Herem graduated in 2012 with a 
master’s degree from the ENDC and from the Baltic Defense 
College’s Higher Command Studies Course. He is currently 
commander of the ENDC. 
Lieutenant Colonel Kashif Jamal Khan has served in the 
Pakistani Air Force as a fighter pilot for 20 years. After commis-
sioning in 1993, he served in a number of different Air Force 
squadrons. He is a qualified flight instructor, flight safety officer 
and quality assurance officer and served as an instructor pilot 
at Pakistan’s Combat Commander school (equivalent to the 
U.S Navy’s Top Gun school). LTC Khan has also served as a 
flight commander (training), flight commander (operations), 
and commander of a fighter squadron. He earned degrees in 
science, aviation, and war studies from Pakistan’s top universi-
ties before coming to NPS. He received his Master of Science 
degree in Defense Analysis from NPS in June 2013.
Major Greg Merkl is a Special Forces Officer who currently 
serves as a mathematics instructor at West Point. He completed 
his undergraduate in Economics and Electrical Engineering 
from the United States Military Academy, and recently gradu-
ated from NPS with a master’s degree in Defense Analysis and 
Applied Mathematics. MAJ Merkl has deployed to Iraq and Af-
ghanistan multiple times as a member of the 3rd Special Forces 
Group, the 75th Ranger Regiment, and the 82nd Airborne 
Division. His most recent deployment included conducting 
village stability operations in Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan. 
Colonel Imre Porkoláb is presently serving as the Hungarian 
national liaison representative at NATO Allied Command 
Transformation, in Norfolk, Virginia. Earlier in his career, 
COL Porkoláb played a pivotal role in developing the Hun-
garian Army’s SOF capability while serving with the MoD, 
Joint Forces Command, and finally as the commander of 
Hungary’s SF battalion. He has operational experience in both 
Iraq and Afghanistan. He has earned master’s degrees in the 
fields of leadership, international relations, and defense analysis 
through studies in Hungary, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. He also holds a PhD in Military Sciences.
Captain Olavi Punga began his active duty with the Estonian 
Defense League (Kaitseliit) in 1994, serving until 1998. From 
1998 to 2002, CPT Punga served as the director of the Estonian 
National Defense College (ENDC) War Museum, and from 
2002 to 2012 as a lecturer in military history. Since 2012, CPT 
Punga has been a researcher in the ENDC Applied Research 
Center. He graduated from Tartu University with a master’s de-
gree in 2009, and expects to complete his doctoral dissertation 
in 2014. CPT Punga has published extensively in the Defense 
League’s magazine Kaitse Kodu about the World War II–era 
Forest Brothers’ movement in Estonia, as well as the history of 
the Defense League.
Lieutenant Colonel Ramey L. Wilson is an Army internal 
medicine physician who has served in operational assignments 
and deployments with both conventional and Special Opera-
tions units. He recently graduated from the Defense Analysis 
curriculum in Special Operations/Irregular Warfare at NPS. 
During his studies and research, he focused on post-conflict 
reconstruction and stability operations, and explored the role 
of health development as a key component of any security 
strengthening mission. Dr. Wilson currently serves as a general 
internal medicine fellow at the Walter Reed National Military 
Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland, and is an assistant 
professor of medicine at the Uniformed Services University.
About the Contributors
I have wondered many times whether external reality exists 
independently from how the observer sees it. What, in other words, is reality? 
A few years ago, in the Italian town of Monza, keeping a goldfish in a bowl 
was banned. The explanation was that it was cruel to keep a fish in a bowl 
with curved sides, because the fish would have only a distorted view of reality. 
But how do we know that we have a true, undistorted view of reality? Might 
not we ourselves be inside some kind of big goldfish bowl, so that our vision 
is distorted by an enormous lens? Even looking through a curved bowl, the 
goldfish would still be able to formulate scientific laws based on its own obser-
vations, and these might even enable it to make predictions about the future 
of the objects outside the bowl. Like the goldfish, many of the military leaders 
who participated in Operation Anaconda had a distorted view of reality.
Gathering information about Operation Anaconda, which took place in 
March 2002 and was the first major battle of the Afghanistan war after Tora 
Bora, is not hard by any means. The internet is full of firsthand accounts of 
what had happened and the lessons ostensibly learned from the operation. 
Rather than offer any judgmental assessments of anyone in particular, my 
intent in this article is to map out the dynamics of the many decision-making 
layers during a complex military operation, using Anaconda as a case study.
Some important lessons have yet to be learned from this epic battle in Af-
ghanistan. In this article, I contend that a different kind of leadership develop-
ment is needed if we want to prepare our leaders for future conflicts, especially 
asymmetric ones. Certain situations require different approaches, and an 
unconventional leadership style is best suited for asymmetric conflicts. I also 
maintain that the key to success on a battlefield, especially in an asymmetric 
environment like Afghanistan in 2002, has very little to do with the electronic 
gadgetry and technology of modern warfare, and much more to do with the 
mind-set of leaders and the decisions they make, as well as how the subordi-
nates execute these decisions. 
The Participants
In early January 2002, there were about 50 U.S. personnel living in and oper-
ating out of a safe house in the city of Gardez, in eastern Afghanistan. It was 
an interesting gathering: without any official documents or directive to guide 
them, this group managed to reorganize the U.S. force structure occupying 
outposts in the frontier areas all across Afghanistan.1 The people involved in 
these early days were members of Advanced Force Operations (AFO), which 
was a highly unusual concept organization in itself.2 AFO is a term used by 
the U.S. Department of Defense to describe a task force made up of SOF 
personnel whose job is to precede the main force into the area of operations 
and carry out whatever preparation work is needed. This may include, among 
other things, reconnaissance and surveillance, reception, staging, onward 
When the Goldfish Meets the Anaconda:
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movement, integration of forces, terminal guidance, and, possibly, direct 
action. In Afghanistan, Special Forces and the CIA seemed to be sharing 
information and cooperating with each other in an unprecedented manner. 
The AFO and Special Forces tactical operations centers (TOCs) were also co-
located in Gardez;3 they all seemed to agree that sharing a common operating 
picture would help everyone in the fight. It was understood by this group that 
for Operation Anaconda, the CIA and AFO were essentially working as one 
organization.4
At the beginning of the operation, teams were gathering intelligence in order 
to develop the situation, including all the open-source information that 
was available to them.5 Soon they identified a potential target, Jalaluddin 
Haqqani, whose greatest battlefield victories had occurred near a high valley 
called Shah-i-Khot.6 This place was little known to the Americans, but they 
read some declassified reporting on the battle of Shah-i-Khot, together with 
reports on lessons learned. Based on open-source intelligence, they learned 
that Haqqani was hiding in the mountains above the valley with a consider-
able number of al Qaeda fighters, and was preparing to fight an asymmetric 
guerrilla war against the U.S. forces.
As their training directed, the Special Forces personnel had established ties 
with the local tribal leaders, but intelligence was still scarce and the teams 
decided to spread across the frontier and further develop their network. Local 
knowledge, as always, seemed to be invaluable, and they were soon convinced 
that Shah-i-Khot was where the enemy was hiding. At this time, the difficulty 
was to confirm the enemy’s presence without being detected, and thus prepare 
the ground for a larger operation. The AFO commander, whose team would 
carry out this task, was strongly against using helicopters because they would 
make it impossible to do a sub-rosa infiltration; more importantly, he was 
looking for creative options to obtain the necessary information. For what 
looked like an impossible reconnaissance mission, he needed more specially 
trained men on very short notice. Getting permission from the commander 
was not easy, however, and this reveals some aspects of the C2 relationships 
during the entire operation.
AFO at that time was reporting to Task Force 11. AFO was only a small part 
of TF 11, whose main body at that time was located at Bagram Air Base.7 
The deputy commanding general in charge of TF 11 at the time, an Air Force 
brigadier, was an exceptionally experienced special operations pilot, but not 
an exceptionally experienced special operations ground commander.8 He must 
have been a good bureaucrat, though, because he believed that an accom-
plished leader can effectively lead just about any type of organization.9 To 
assist him, he had a staff of more than 100 personnel in Bagram and a massive 
TOC a thousand miles away in the Persian Gulf.10 From the very beginning, 
the AFO commander seemed to be constantly at odds with the TF 11 deputy 
commander over the best way to proceed with operations against the Taliban, 
with the latter favoring a mass attack with Rangers and air assault troops, and 
the AFO leader favoring precision assaults with Tier 1 AFO teams. 
Conventional wisdom says that any organization that exceeds 100 personnel 
is by nature a bureaucratic one. The TOC was such an organization, run by 
standard armed forces protocol, with access to sophisticated technology and 
massive databases to ensure mission effectiveness for the main body—the 
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SEALs and the Rangers. As Sean Naylor described it in his book about Opera-
tion Anaconda, some internal friction was also present in the command.11 The 
TF 11 commander’s12 concept of operations was to keep the direct action force 
based at Bagram intact, waiting for intelligence on high-value targets; once 
a location was pinpointed, the “door-kickers” would launch a raid to kill or 
capture the target.13 Some staff personnel, in contrast, thought that dividing 
the main force and pushing units out to safe houses in the vicinity, where 
the action was most likely to happen, would bring about greater mission 
effectiveness. The flight time from Bagram was too long to take advantage of 
time-sensitive targets, so it seems it would have been wise to do at least some 
forward deployment. 
The most important task the AFO leader had on hand was to get the best 
people specifically suited for the particular mission he faced. To get command 
approval, he flew to Bagram for a video-teleconference with the deputy com-
mander, who was located in Masirah, and the commanding general, who was 
in his office in North Carolina and frankly doubted the presence of a large 
pocket of al Qaeda fighters in the Shah-i-Khot Valley.14 From an operational 
perspective, this information just did not make sense to the general, but it 
seems that there was a personal component to the disagreement as well.15 
“Their personalities are oil and water—they don’t mix,” said a JSOC officer 
who knew both men.16 The AFO leader, who had a record of standing by and 
representing his men during missions, obviously already had a reputation for 
independent thinking, and this time around, he was again in close coordina-
tion with the CIA and just about every other force in the area. It seems that 
the independent role the AFO had been awarded greatly troubled some of the 
higher leadership, including the TF 11 commander. Nevertheless, the JSOC 
commander agreed to provide two thirds of the additional personnel the AFO 
leader had asked for. The AFO could carry on being innovative, adaptive, and 
audacious.
The new reconnaissance specialists arrived within 48 hours of the AFO’s 
request, all of them with recent operational experience in Afghanistan. Their 
main tasks were to find the enemy and to recon routes to the general area 
of the Shah-i-Khot Valley. They decided to test ground routes of infiltration 
and do environmental reconnaissance for testing the perimeter of the valley, 
without actually entering it. The teams approached the mission with an open 
mind, experimented with different options, and came up with their own ideas. 
The AFO leader didn’t tell them how to do their jobs but instead provided a 
conducive environment for them to work in. The AFO leader also wanted to 
gain time to develop the situation.17 Within a week, he had a fairly good idea 
of the ground around the valley. The AFO had learned how to navigate the 
terrain, and the extremely harsh weather was also in their favor. 
By mid-February, the 10th Mountain Division assumed the lead for planning 
an operation into the valley, named Operation Anaconda. To better exercise 
command and control of the operation, 10th Mountain headquarters moved 
down from Uzbekistan to Bagram Air Base outside Kabul. This move, ac-
complished between 13–20 February 2002, disrupted planning. The general 
in charge of the 10th Mountain Division commanded three battalions of 
U.S. conventional infantry, and also assumed operational command of all 
American forces in Afghanistan, with just one exception: TF 11. This meant 
that the AFO had no official C2 link to the 10th Mountain Division command. 
The TF 11 commander’s concept 
of operations was to keep 
the direct action force based 
at Bagram intact, waiting for 
intelligence on high-value targets.
It seems that the independent 
role the AFO had been 
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Moreover, these new command relationships drastically changed the way the 
locally established military forces were expected to operate. After operating for 
the previous five months as a geographically dispersed, SOF-centric force with 
decentralized planning for most ground operations at the JSOTF level, they 
were now told to work as a geographically concentrated, large conventional 
ground force, on operations that required detailed functional component 
planning. These major operational changes had to be accomplished within 
a relatively brief period, which meant the forces did not have much time to 
adjust from their accustomed conduct to the way that Operation Anaconda 
would be executed. 
In spite of this, the AFO commander immediately sent a liaison up to the 10th 
Mountain TOC. This move made a lot of sense, since by that time it was 
apparent that the AFO personnel had been developing the situation for the 
10th Mountain Division’s assault. The AFO leader made sure that all mission-
critical information was shared with the division command. 
The Plan
Operation Anaconda officially started with a meeting at a Special Forces safe 
house in Kabul, where all participating unit leaders came together to pool 
their knowledge and ideas, and ensure a shared vision of the operation.18 
At this meeting, the 101st Airborne Infantry representative (part of the 10th 
Mountain planning group) argued that the key to the success of the operation 
was an air assault by helicopters. This was no surprise, given that in the mid-
1960s, the 101st pioneered the air assault concept, at the time a revolutionary 
military tactic. The air-mobile infantry training and the logic of the infantry 
major was flawless—this was his professional reality. The Special Forces leaders 
in the room, however, were strongly against the concept, especially the AFO 
leader, who knew firsthand about the terrain and had studied the enemy in 
depth. He assumed that the enemy also expected an air assault and was likely 
prepared to counter it. The AFO leader wanted more time to prove his point, 
but the military decision-making process took over and the planning con-
tinued based on partial information. 
From a military perspective, it must have been very weird to see the Special 
Forces operators dressed in their scarves and chitlari hats, with long, unkempt 
beards and hair. Their appearance made a lot of sense in the frontier areas, 
but was very unorthodox in Bagram. In spite of the early difficulties, the AFO 
personnel developed a solid relationship with the 10th Mountain Division 
staff, based on mutual respect. They both understood that they needed to 
work closely together if they were going to fight this battle side by side in 
the Shah-i-Khot Valley. Word of this relationship got back to the TF 11 com-
manding general, however, and it made him furious.19 The AFO leader was 
told by a staff officer at TF 11 that he might be relieved of command of AFO, 
and this information understandably unsettled him.20 Nevertheless, because of 
his commitment to the mission and his men, he decided not to change policy 
and carried on cooperating with the 10th Mountain Division command. As a 
result, AFO personnel were sent in to be the eyes and ears of the assault force 
during the operation.21 
On 27 February 2002, three teams of AFO began infiltrating the area, with 
three objectives: to occupy strategic positions on the tops of the mountains, 
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to confirm the presence of the enemy, and to check that the helicopter landing 
zones (LZs) were clear for the 10th Mountain Division to land and destroy 
the enemy (mainly with smart bombs launched from aircraft overhead). 
The operational commander was planning to carry out a hammer-and-anvil 
maneuver, with the Special Forces in Gardez (together with local Afghan 
forces) as the hammer and the 10th Mountain as the anvil, flying in their 
CH-47s to land in the eastern part of the valley and destroy the fleeing enemy. 
10th Mountain command’s plan was based on three key assumptions. The first 
assumption was that the enemy forces in the Shah-i-Khot Valley consisted of 
only several hundred personnel. The second was that enemy forces might be 
warned of the coming attack by the local population, or even by agents within 
the friendly Afghan forces, so full details of the operation were not shared 
with the participating Afghan units. Finally, the 10th Mountain plan was 
designed around the assumption that the enemy would flee the area through the 
mountain passes ahead of the friendly Afghan troops, where U.S. and coalition 
forces would be waiting to catch them. Based on previous experience, the 10th 
Mountain commander and his staff were more worried that the enemy forces 
would escape, as they had repeatedly done, than they were about encountering 
stiff enemy resistance.22 Both presumptions, about enemy strength and likely 
course of action, later proved to be incorrect, while the withholding of infor-
mation from the Afghan forces caused disruptions during the operation.
To achieve tactical surprise, the 10th Mountain commander insisted that the 
pre-infiltration airstrikes begin as late as possible. There was also concern 
that heavy strikes on caves would destroy documents that could otherwise be 
exploited to facilitate the capture of other terrorists. For both of these rea-
sons, the 10th Mountain planners decided on a compromise plan that called 
for fewer than 20 targets to be hit, beginning about 30 minutes before the 
helicopters landed.
The plan did not make a lot of sense to the Special Forces personnel. It was 
too complex, and it relied too much on the use of helicopters, which were 
highly vulnerable in this type of terrain, something that had become clear 
during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 20 years previous. It was apparent 
at the launch of the mission that all participants—AFO, Special Forces, and 
10th Mountain Division—had quite a lot of concerns regarding the plan. 
Then, as Operation Anaconda unfolded, they all seemed to focus narrowly on 
their own roles, even as the plan itself unraveled.
Operation Anaconda
The majority of the AFO teams successfully infiltrated on the night of 28 Feb-
ruary 2002, but one team in particular made little progress. This team finally 
encountered an enemy position on the very location where it was supposed to 
set up an observation post (OP), so its members decided to take out the enemy 
before they moved onto location. Only later was it learned that none of the 
satellites or spy planes that scoped the area had detected any enemy activity or 
weapons in the mountains around Shah-i-Khot.23 This technological “all clear” 
further convinced the high-level leadership that it was unnecessary to risk AFO 
personnel in long-range infiltrations through the hazardous terrain, by reaf-
firming their initial assumption that there was very little enemy presence in the 
valley and the surrounding mountains. The infiltration teams sent situation 
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reports that directly contradicted this information, so the situation became 
a classic “technology or boots-on-the-ground” debate. As it turned out, the 
enemy had done their homework, and their use of low-level camouflage 
techniques had paid off by deceiving the high-tech equipment. 
By this time, the tension between AFO and TF 11 had intensified. The AFO 
team’s decision to take out the enemy on the OP site was not supported by 
TF 11 command, which insisted that the team was not an assault team but 
reconnaissance only.24 The two commands’ concept of C2 and leadership was 
also different. The AFO leader firmly believed that commanding a mission like 
this required a delicate balance between asking and telling, so he was relying 
mainly on his team (the boots on the ground) to recommend a course of ac-
tion, and frequently asking the question, “What is your recommendation?”25 
It is clear that for AFO, the main purpose of C2 was to share a reality, while for 
TF 11, it was to pass down orders. The AFO teams also sent pictures through 
the AFO leader up to TF 11, proving that the enemy had anti-aircraft capability 
and was dug into the mountain ready to fight, instead of fleeing towards the 
anvil that was waiting in the valley.26 
The convoy of Special Forces personnel and their Afghan partners also fell 
behind schedule. For the Afghans, this convoy was yet another strange 
organization superimposed by Western military tactics. They were used to 
scattering around on the mountainside, not attacking in a strict formation. 
Convoy movement was also a tactic very rarely practiced by the Afghans, and 
there were vehicle rollovers along the bad roads that further demoralized the 
Afghan personnel. To make matters worse, the convoy fell victim to a friendly 
fire incident involving an AC-130, in which four U.S. and Afghan vehicles 
were destroyed.27 Many of the Afghans fled afterward, and the hammer was 
falling apart before it was even in place.
D-Day for Anaconda was originally set for 28 February. Due to bad weather, 
the 10th Mountain commander postponed the start to 2 March. Based on 
what they saw from the ground, the AFO teams at this point were indicating 
that the area was not suitable for helicopters to land. This information 
encountered a lot of resistance in the 10th Mountain Division command, 
whose staff officers had been putting the plan together for days and were very 
reluctant to alter it. Again, the military planning process proved inflexible, 
and once the ball started rolling, it was almost impossible to make adaptive 
changes, no matter what the operator on the ground was telling headquarters. 
The situation became a classic 
“technology or boots-on-
the-ground” debate.  As it 
turned out, the enemy had 
done their homework.
For AFO, the main purpose 
of C2 was to share a reality, 
while for TF, 11 it was to 
pass down orders.
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Before dawn on 2 March, F-15Es, B-1s, and B-52s began dropping JDAMs 
(Joint Direct Attack Munitions—smart bombs), conventional and thermobaric 
bombs on the small number of approved targets. Following the bombing 
raid, U.S. helicopters entered the valley. When the first wave of helicopters 
started touching down on the valley floor, they came under heavy mortar and 
machine-gun fire. Several soldiers were wounded instantly, and the anvil itself 
was getting hammered. At this point, the 10th Mountain Division com-
mander decided to call off the second wave of helicopters and immediately 
started to focus on evacuating the wounded and moving troops out of the 
killing zone.
This dire situation was nonetheless an opportunity for the AFO. The enemy 
was engaged and therefore susceptible to targeting, a development the AFO 
operators used to their advantage by directing the fire of the supporting 
aircraft towards the enemy positions and causing serious damage among the 
insurgent fighters. The three AFO teams were engaged in a continuous cycle 
of describing targets, vectoring attack aircraft, and destroying the enemy. The 
exposed 10th Mountain troops were the unintentional bait that made it pos-
sible to detect and destroy the enemy outposts and formations.28
On the second day of the operation, the three American forces involved in 
Anaconda were dealing with three very different realities regarding the situa-
tion in the Shah-i-Khot Valley. The Special Forces and the Afghans were still 
stuck outside of the valley, frustrated with not being able to get in. The 10th 
Mountain Division forces were inside the valley being overwhelmed by enemy 
fire, while the 101st commander was telling the 10th Mountain Division com-
mander to pull out immediately. The three AFO teams had the best situational 
awareness thanks to their bird’s-eye view of the valley, and were pounding the 
enemy with the help of the Air Force. 
The AFO leader, having eavesdropped on the conversation between the 101st 
commander and the operational commander, called the 10th Mountain Divi-
sion commander to give his situational assessment. To the AFO commander, 
it was clear that the leaders’ decisions high up the food chain were based on 
a false reality.29 The commanders were not fully aware of the situation on the 
ground, and their reality was based on the filtered information that came 
On the second day of the 
operation, the three American 
forces were dealing with 




through PowerPoint staff briefs and Predator feeds. Remarkably, the general, 
after a brief discussion with his key staff, changed his mind based on this new 
information!30 He seems to have pushed aside his ego and, in a moment of 
total chaos, made the decision not to pull out but to carry on with the mis-
sion as it was planned. This decision forced the pinned-down 10th Mountain 
soldiers to innovate and adapt to the situation as well. At the same time, the 
AFO leader decided to move forward with the Special Forces and the Afghans, 
who had been gathered by then, to make another attempt at entering the Shah-
i-Khot Valley. The eventual reinsertion of the 400 Afghan fighters enabled the 
Americans to seal the valley. 
To make the situation even more complex, on the evening of 3 March, the 
AFO commander received notice from the commander of TF 11 that two SEAL 
teams were to be inserted into the Shahi-Khot Valley on very short notice.31 
The AFO leader objected to the order, replying that inserting anyone without 
sufficient preparation and rehearsal would result in failure. He was not heeded. 
The two SEAL teams, Mako 30 and Mako 21, planned to establish an OP at 
either end of the valley. One team would move to the peak of Takur Ghar, 
which commanded the southern approach to the Shahi-Khot Valley. Due 
to time constraints, a helicopter insertion would be needed for the teams to 
reach the peak before dawn. The SEAL team commander requested authoriza-
tion to shift the insertion by 24 hours, to the next evening, but was directed 
that insertion was critical to SOF providing support to the operation.32
Before the insertion, an 
AC-130 scanned the mountain 
for the helicopter LZ through 
its infrared sensors and radar. 
These sensors enable the 
gunship crew to make a visual 
or electronic identification in 
almost any conditions, but 
the individuals operating the 
equipment on this particular 
night did not know the 
operational context for their 
search, or what specifically 
they were looking for, so they 
pronounced the mountain 
secure.33 Even though the 
overhead imagery showed no 
signs of life on the peak of 
Takur Ghar, the commander 
of SEAL team Mako 30 gave 
the team final guidance, per SOP, that if any signs were seen, the mission 
would be aborted. Mako 30 was picked up by an MH-47 Chinook helicopter, 
at 23:23 on 3 March. Originally, an insertion point 1,300 meters (1,400 yards) 
east of the peak was identified. However, the Chinook experienced engine 
difficulties, and another MH-47 was dispatched to replace it. This delay meant 
that the SEALs could not be inserted into the LZ east of the peak until 02:30 
on 4 March, which did not allow them enough time to reach the peak before 
The AFO leader objected 
that inserting anyone without 
sufficient preparation 
would result in failure. 
He was not heeded.
The Operation Anaconda battle zone.
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daylight. Because of these unforeseen developments, the SEALs of Mako 30 
were forced to land on the peak itself.
At approximately 03:00, the Chinook attempted to land atop the mountain. 
As they approached, the pilots and SEALs observed tracks in the snow and 
other signs of recent human activity. As they discussed a possible mission 
abort, two RPGs slammed into the helicopter, shutting down one of its engines, 
the electric system, and the hydraulic systems, and causing one team member 
to fall out of the open ramp. The disabled helicopter was forced to crash-land 
in the valley below, approximately four miles away. AFO teams from their OP 
could see the incident, and sent out a stream of reporting as events unfolded. 
A Predator drone was also flying overhead, sending indistinct images back to 
the commanders in Bagram and Masirah.34 
The situation was very similar to what happened when the 10th Mountain Di-
vision’s first wave of assault began. Every piece of the puzzle presented its own 
version of reality to those monitoring the situation. In the TOCs at Bagram 
and Masirah, the commanders were watching the Predator feed, which was a 
blurry image streamed by an aircraft flying at an altitude of nearly 6,000 me-
ters (17,000 feet) with a narrow field of view.35 The AFO leader was listening 
to the traffic on his radio net, while the SEAL and 10th Mountain personnel 
in the valley were seeing each other on the ground. Together they had the full 
picture, but this picture was not shared among them, so each group focused 
on the piece it saw. They all had different vested interests in the situation as 
well. The SEALs were of course dedicated to rescuing their teammate who had 
fallen from the chopper. 
The Ranger Quick Reaction Force (QRF) located at Bagram Air Base was called 
in to help search for the fallen SEAL, who was now alone on the mountaintop. 
Meanwhile, Mako 30 regrouped and was ferried by nearby units to a CH-47 
to go back to Takur Ghar and find their fallen comrade. The AC-130 that had 
earlier scanned the LZ was then directed to attack the large groupings of 
enemy combatants currently exposed on top of the mountain, one to three 
minutes before the Mako 30 was scheduled to arrive.
To make a difficult situation worse, at this point someone at the Masirah 
headquarters 1,100 miles away decided to switch to a new radio frequency, 
and began directing all the forces and aircraft involved in the rescue of the 
fallen SEAL atop Takur Ghar.36 Although the change may have been meant 
to enhance direct control of the rescue operation, it had the critical effect of 
severely limiting communications between the different teams participating in 
the battle. The AC-130 commander continued to use the sat-com channel to 
communicate, not knowing that he had been switched over from command 
headquarters to a TF 11 staff officer, and this again created a lot of confusion.37
As the CH-47 with the SEALs onboard neared its destination, the AC-130 
radioed on the new satellite frequency for confirmation to fire on the enemy 
surrounding the fallen SEAL. The crew were unable to get a clear answer from 
the officer they reached, and also were unable to connect with the AFO teams. 
As a result, the AC-130 crew never received permission to fire on the moun-
taintop. The CH-47 nevertheless successfully landed the team on the ground 
amidst heavy machine gun and rocket fire. The Mako 30 team charged the 
enemy position, but had no radio contact with the AC-130 to call for support. 
As they discussed a possible 
mission abort, two RPGs 
slammed into the helicopter.
At this point, someone at the 
Masirah headquarters 1,100 
miles away decided to switch 
to a new radio frequency.
The full picture was not shared 
among them, so each group 
focused on the piece it saw.
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Finally they were able to establish communications via a line-of-sight radio 
that the AFO had positioned on Takur Ghar, taking advantage of the AFO’s 
knowledge of enemy movements in real time. Air Force rules, however, pro-
hibited AC-130 aircraft from remaining in hostile airspace in daylight (after the 
crash of an AC-130 in Khafji in the Gulf War), so the AC-130 support protecting 
Mako 30 was forced to leave before the Ranger team onboard Razor 01 reached 
the LZ.
At 03:45, TF 11 alerted the Ranger QRF, but the two QRF Chinooks were not 
equipped with functioning satellite radios to maintain communication with 
the HQ in Bagram or, even more critically, with the AFO team leader. The pilot 
of Razor 01 was not told about the enemy’s anti-aircraft location on top of 
the mountain, nor did the Rangers have any idea what their specific mission 
was.38 The QRF was to establish communication for further instructions when 
Razor 02 reached Gardez, 10 minutes from the mountain. As events unfolded, 
the Ranger QRF flew into the same enemy trap that the SEALs had flown into, 
because no one had been able to communicate the reality of the situation. At 
approximately 06:10, the Chinook approached the landing zone. The aircraft 
immediately began taking fire, and the right door mini-gunner was killed. 
An RPG then hit the helicopter, destroying the right engine and forcing it to 
crash-land.
After landing on the unsecured mountaintop, the rescue mission itself turned 
into a near disaster. As the Rangers and special tactics team members left the 
aircraft, three were immediately killed. The survivors took cover as a fierce 
firefight began. The Rangers fought a desperate battle for hours, until one 
of the AFO teams was able to help them by relaying enemy positions over 
the radio, while simultaneously providing targeting guidance to the attack 
aircraft flying above.39 In the meantime, Razor 02, which had been diverted 
to Gardez, returned at 06:25 with the rest of the Ranger QRF and the SEAL 
team leader. With the help of the new arrivals and close air support, the force 
was eventually able to consolidate its position on the peak. It continued with 
the rescue mission, and at around 20:00, the QRF and Mako 30 were finally 
exfiltrated from Takur Ghar peak.40 Because they had remained undetected 
in an observation post throughout the firefight, the AFO were able to provide 
critical support by coordinating multiple coalition air strikes to prevent the 
enemy fighters from overrunning the downed aircraft, to devastating effect.
In the meantime, the attempt to reinsert the Afghan forces into the valley 
finally had its effect by pushing the enemy fighters out of their positions, 
while the AFO teams continued targeting the enemy formations. This was a 
turning point in the battle. 
Ultimately, the battle for the Shah-i-Khot Valley lasted for almost two weeks, 
but in the end, the steady flow of U.S. and coalition reinforcements into 
the fight finally broke enemy resistance. On 16 March, the 10th Mountain 
commander declared the end of Operation Anaconda. By that time, coalition 
forces were firmly in control of the entire Shah-i-Khot Valley and the sur-
rounding area. Reporting on the casualty rate is inconsistent to say the least, 
but it is estimated that the U.S. forces suffered 80 casualties in the operation, 
with 8 killed and 72 wounded. Several Afghan soldiers died in the fighting 
as well. Estimates of al Qaeda and Taliban casualties range from 100 to 500, 
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with U.S. commanders favoring the higher estimates and Afghan commanders 
citing the lower ones. An unknown number of enemy fighters were able to 
escape the Shah-i-Khot Valley into Pakistan.
Unconventional Leadership
This case study exemplifies the very distinctive and complex leadership 
requirements and characters that arise in irregular warfare. The AFO leader, 
the TF 11 TOC, and the 10th Mountain subordinate units and their com-
mander were working on the same mission, but as this article shows, they did 
not work from a shared reality. This is partly because of the clashes between 
the different cultures of the Services (Army, Air Force, and Special Forces), 
but mainly because there was a gap in leadership education. Some Services 
might do better than others in this field, but there is room for improvement 
everywhere. Closing this gap should include education for leaders at all levels 
in how to deal with the highly complex and uncertain situations of irregular 
warfare. This is a different kind of leadership: unconventional leadership.
As Ronald Heifetz observed, “[O]ur language fails us in many aspects of 
our lives, entrapping us in a set of cultural assumptions.”41 Leadership in 
an asymmetric conflict has to be very different from what we typically have 
been trained to do as military personnel. Conventional wisdom says that 
military units are most likely to succeed in the field when they follow strict 
C2 procedures. Operation Anaconda showed in several instances, however, 
that following conventional wisdom created confusion on an unconventional 
battlefield, and arguably cost the lives of brave warriors. Western industrial-
ized militaries are organized and trained to operate through a top-down, rigid 
hierarchy, and they tend to stick to this familiar system despite changing 
circumstances. In an asymmetric conflict, this is the same as settling into our 
personal comfort zone, not wanting to venture out into new territory. Before 
digging deeper into the realm of unconventional leadership in an asymmetric 
environment, let us consider the comfort zone model (see Figure 1, next page).
Your comfort zone is the area of your life where you feel relaxed and at ease, 
because your current skill set allows you to easily navigate within that area. 
For instance, you may be very comfortable with your daily schedule, but you 
want to increase your energy and become more fit. Taking up some form of 
regular exercise initially moves you out of your current comfort zone and 
causes a little distress, but it helps you reach your goal of being fitter, and 
gradually becomes part of your familiar routine. 
Now, imagine a problem materializing in your life for which you do not have 
a solution or skill set. This problem could potentially pull you out of your 
mental comfort zone if you make the decision to face it. It could even create 
some anxiety in you—in fact, your anxiety and stress levels will rise propor-
tionally the further you go from your area of familiarity. In this case, you are 
in what is called the learning zone, and if you tackle your problem, something 
interesting happens: your comfort zone expands, because by learning a new 
way of solving the problem or acquiring a new skill, you have expanded your 
universe.
The best way to grow your comfort zone is to stay within the learning zone 
or at the edge between the learning and panic zones. The panic zone is where 
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your current skill set is nowhere near the level that is needed, or the difficulty 
you are facing is utterly different from those you have encountered before. 
You can go into the panic zone, and it can potentially create rapid growth and 
vastly accelerate your learning, but it’s also likely that you will see this as a 
negative experience. It all depends on how well you can handle these situa-
tions. In general, going into the learning zone is the right approach, and only 
the very adventurous should deliberately cross into the zone of panic.
There is a zone beyond the panic zone, often called the zone of failure. If you 
reach too far outside of your skills and knowledge, you set yourself and your 
organization up for failure. Although we can certainly learn from mistakes, 
operating in the failure zone, especially for the military, will not bring about 
accelerated learning and is likely to cost the lives of our men and women. 
Leaving your comfort zone feels, naturally, uncomfortable. But this is a good 
thing. Sometimes you have to force yourself to go through the discomfort in 
order to get to the level you want to be on. Interestingly, scientists have dis-
covered that being outside the comfort zone raises one’s level of happiness, as 
long as one doesn’t get into the red panic zone. Adaptation and expansion can 
be a very rewarding and enjoyable experience, one that our military leaders 
not only have to practice regularly, but have to learn to incorporate into their 
everyday lives.
Our military training is based on following orders, but as recent research 
suggests, there is a clear distinction between leadership and authority. As the 
Anaconda study showed, especially in the case of the AFO leader, on the one 
hand, people without formal authority can practice leadership on any given 
issue at any given time. On the other hand, we have all seen cases in our lives 
when people had formal authority, and thus a following per se, but they did 
not lead. The most interesting leadership operates without anyone feeling 
as though they are following.42 This form of leadership is often observed in 
the zones of challenge and panic. I call this phenomenon unconventional 
leadership. 
What is interesting is that genuine unconventional leaders can mobilize even 
those who are opposed to action, or who are just fence-sitting. This is an 
essential skill in an asymmetric conflict, where mobilizing the fence-sitting 
portion of the population is the ultimate goal if we want to achieve strategic 
victory. In the Anaconda case, the AFO leader was not only able to mobilize 
the local tribal leaders, but he managed to navigate his way through bureau-
cratic channels as well, and changed the mind of the 10th Mountain Division 
The most interesting leadership 
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Figure 1: The Comfort Zone Model
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commander about aborting the mission at a very decisive moment of the 
battle. He cultivated close ties with the 10th Mountain Division command 
although officially discouraged from doing so, a bit of insubordination that 
paid off at a vital moment. Through constantly sharing the reality of the 
battle from his perspective, he managed to mobilize the leadership by raising 
their awareness of the operation’s complexities, which demanded trade-offs 
throughout the battle. 
One of the major questions that arises when we try to conceptualize un-
conventional leadership is, Where does it takes place and how can we anchor 
more “following” in the process? 
Leadership, as in the zone of comfort model, emerges in the context of 
problems and complex challenges. In fact, leadership isn’t much of a consider-
ation when everyone is playing from the same sheet of music and all we need 
to do is keep the beat while coordinating routine activities. Good leaders step 
up when a tough or complex problem arises, and are willing to tackle it by 
moving themselves and their followers directly into the zone of learning. Some 
especially skilled leaders also dare to step into the zone of panic when they 
realize that operating under the current structures and processes is no longer 
sufficient.  Unconventional leadership in most cases results in organizational 
or procedural changes, and most importantly, influences the thinking of 
people within the organization. (See Figure 2.)
Complex problems are also multilayered, and can be divided into three 
distinct categories: technical, adaptive, and critical.43  
Technical problems fall within the range of our current problem-solving ex-
pertise, but stand out as unusual nevertheless. In our case study, dealing with 
helicopters in an austere environment can be a technical challenge. To solve it, 
what we need to do is to apply the right kind of expertise to the problem in 
order to get a solution. 
Adaptive problems require new perspectives, expertise, and solutions. This 
type of problem is the real innovator’s challenge, because first we need to 
diagnose the problem, develop an understanding of it, and then create a new 
set of tools to solve it. An adaptive problem often creates a lot of friction 
within organizations. In the Anaconda case study, setting up and operating an 
AFO organization was an adaptive challenge in itself.
An adaptive problem often 
creates a lot of friction 
within organizations.
Leadership emerges in the 
context of problems and 
complex challenges.
Figure 2: The Unconventional Leadership Model
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Critical problems require new ways of working as well, but these problems 
are by definition less controlled or predictable. In such cases, the intensity of 
the situation demands immediate action. The first suggestion often is to slow 
down (“take a deep breath”), share perspectives, and then focus the team’s 
actions toward the solution. In critical problems, the stakes are also very high, 
and this puts a lot of stress on leaders. 
Many of the complex problems military leaders face in an asymmetric environ-
ment are in either the adaptive or critical categories. These complex problems 
require people to operate in the zone of learning, and even the zone of panic, 
in terms of our comfort zone model. Adaptive and critical problems can also 
be conceptualized as a gap between our aspirations and the reality, which 
demands a response outside of our current thinking or skill sets. The main dif-
ference between a technical and an adaptive/critical problem is whether that 
gap can be closed through applying existing know-how. The main difference 
between an adaptive and a critical problem, by contrast, is the size of the time 
window available to sort out the situation.
Adaptive and critical problems also demand learning, as we have seen throughout 
the case study: the AFO leader was constantly developing his understanding 
of the situation, and led by listening to his men on the ground. It is also 
important to understand that the learning process reaches far beyond just 
collecting information. We need to apply those lessons that we gathered in 
the past to the present situation, if we claim to have actually learned anything. 
This constitutes a critical difference within organizations between lessons 
identified and lessons learned. Referring to our comfort zone model, we can 
close the gap between our aspirations and the reality only if we learn new ways 
of thinking and doing, and are able to constantly adapt. This in turn requires 
a new approach in leadership education. 
Another interesting factor that can be observed from Operation Anaconda is 
the people-centric approach of the AFO leader. He was fully aware that in a 
highly complex situation, when facing a critical dilemma, the people “with a 
problem” are the problem, but they can be part of a solution as well. Adaptive 
and critical problems often require a shift in responsibility from the shoulders 
of the authority figures and the authority structure to the stakeholders them-
selves.44 In contrast with technical obstacles, which experts can solve for us, 
overcoming critical situations requires a different level of responsibility and 
leadership. This is where unconventional leadership can thrive. The case study 
shows that responsibility must not only be shared but owned among all the 
stakeholders. If we are looking for authority figures in this kind of situation, 
it means that we are treating critical problems as if they were technical ones, 
and approaching them with a conventional leadership style. In most cases 
this mindset can be highly damaging. We will be better off if we develop the 
situation by relying on the key stakeholders. 
It is also essential that we do frequent reality checks while we are developing 
the situation. As can be seen from the comfort zone model, there is a fine, 
usually indistinct, line that separates the zone of panic from the zone of 
failure. Crossing this line means that we are setting ourselves and our 
organizations up for possible disaster when lives are at stake. If we do not do 
constant reality checks, we not only risk losing an understanding of the reality 
on the ground, but may also set our aspirations so high that we eventually 
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can’t help but fail. This kind of reality check was much needed during Opera-
tion Anaconda, when the Ranger team was inserted by helicopter despite the 
previous failed attempts to send helicopters into the fight.
Finally, we have to consider the time factor, as it is likely to be one of the 
most critical parts of the military decision-making process. As was mentioned 
before, adaptive problems require significantly more time for people to 
learn and develop innovative solutions than do technical problems. Critical 
problems are even worse from the perspective of time, because they do not 
have any ready solutions and also offer little time to find one. Organizations 
in particular generally need time to learn the necessary lessons, and to make 
cultural changes in order to adapt.
Adaptation in an asymmetric environment is the only way forward for both 
individuals and organizations, and those who fail to adapt quickly become 
extinct. This whole process naturally generates resistance from the different 
organizational cultures involved, and even avoidance on the part of those who 
do not have an immediate stake in the problem. Diverting one’s attention 
is one type of problem avoidance, and with today’s access to overwhelming 
amounts of information, it is too easy to forget about something even when 
we consider it to be important. This is why case studies like Operation 
Anaconda are useful, because they can remind us to not repeat the mistakes 
we have made in the past. 
Final Thoughts
A famous example of a model based on a distorted perception of reality, 
like that goldfish looking out from its glass bowl, is the Ptolemaic system of 
astronomy. For centuries after Claudius Ptolemy (c. 90–c. 168 CE) postulated 
his astronomical model, people believed that the Earth was at the center of 
the universe and that the planets moved around it in complicated orbits. The 
Ptolemaic system was adopted by the Catholic Church and held as doctrine 
for more than 1,400 years. It was not until 1543 that an alternative, sun-centric 
model was put forward by Nicolaus Copernicus.
Today we believe we know better. Many people would dismiss the question 
if asked which, the Copernican or the Ptolemaic model, was correct. But one 
could also say that both of them were right, in a way, just as our goldfish is 
right in its acceptance of what those outside the bowl know to be a distorted 
reality. The only difference between the two models is that Copernicus had 
access to more advanced technology with which to observe and interpret the 
same reality.
Hierarchical decision-making implies that the leader at every level of the 
pyramid is the person in charge of deciding and directing everything below 
him. By default, in this model, the highest ranking individual is assumed al-
ways to have the deepest understanding of the problem and the best solutions. 
This structure is very deeply entrenched in the military, but it is unsuitable for 
highly complex asymmetric situations, especially when we are facing adaptive 
and critical problems that are changing minute by minute. 
In an asymmetric environment, the guy on the ground must be entitled 
to make recommendations, based on a recent reality check and a shared 
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understanding of the situation, regardless of how he will look in the eyes of his 
commander. When leaders up the chain regard themselves as all-knowing and 
infallible, the cultural pressure to give “the answer” increases the likelihood of 
making mistakes. One way to avoid this is to not give that answer, but instead 
question the guy on the ground and, with an open and adaptive mind, listen 
closely to his recommendations. This approach would by no means abuse 
the current decision-making system but rather enhance it by encouraging 
personnel to adapt to new security dilemmas and new ways of warfare. The 
concept of adaptation arises from scientific efforts to understand biological 
evolution; the changes needed in the way military leaders think of asymmetric 
conflict require a completely different mind-set—the organizational equiva-
lent of biological thriving.45 
In these situations, unconventional leadership must be the norm, just as the 
conventional leadership model has been the norm for several hundred years 
in bureaucratic military organizations, up through the Cold War. This new 
breed of people, who have the skill to lead in unconventional ways and the 
knowledge to differentiate technical problems from adaptive/critical ones, 
must be protected so they can fruifully share their knowledge with others and 
gain even more experience practicing unconventional leadership in asym-
metric environments. This evolutionary model can be a cornerstone of new 
SOF education as well, which will enable Special Forces personnel all over the 
world to maintain the cutting edge in asymmetric conflict.  
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Incentivizing Cooperation in Afghanistan
MAJ Greg Merkl, U.S. Army The United States’ prospects for success against the Taliban 
insurgency in Afghanistan seem inexorably linked to its ability to inspire co-
operation among disparate actors in a land of dynamic alliances. To centralize 
power in a way that will keep the Taliban from establishing sanctuary—much 
less overt control—in significant regions of the troubled state, the United 
States and its allies must find ways to foster a capable Kabul government. The 
last decade of conflict has only increased the complexity of trying rapidly to 
build a poor, weakly affiliated agrarian society into the likeness of a modern 
democracy. Moreover, lessons from the Afghanistan war demonstrate how 
the United States has made a difficult task monumentally more complicated 
through poor strategic decision-making.
The United States’ profligate use of money to influence loyalties in Afghani-
stan has confused and hindered efforts at establishing legitimate governance, 
at the levels of both the tribal shura and the National Assembly. Financial aid 
certainly serves a vital purpose in rebuilding a war-ravaged land. Too little aid 
can leave a broken state in the violence of desperation. Conversely, too much 
aid can drown a fledgling legal and political system in corruption. A “sweet 
spot” exists where the structure of the financial incentives encourages coopera-
tion according to the rule of law. The United States has substantially overshot 
this sweet spot.
As long as the Department of Defense is going to espouse the concept of 
“money as a weapons system,” it would do well to reestablish the left and 
right limits of its financial weapons.1 A realist’s perspective on the nature of 
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cooperation highlights the fact that the United States has spent hundreds of 
billions of dollars inspiring counterproductive behavior within Afghan society. 
The influx of cash into the Afghan system of social and commercial relation-
ships has not only overwhelmed its modes of accountability, but actually 
encourages unethical and anti-social behavior.
Solving the Prisoner’s Dilemma
The paradigm of the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” illustrates how natural impulses 
tend to favor competition over cooperation. In its simplest outline, the di-
lemma postulates a scenario whereby two individuals can choose to cooperate 
for the best mutual outcome, or compete and risk the worst mutual outcome. 
The incentive structure paradoxically leads them to compete, because each be-
lieves he can gain a unilateral advantage through competition.2 This scenario 
plays out frequently in most societies.3
To illustrate this concept, consider the hypothetical scenario of Daoud and 
Omar, two farmers in modern-day Afghanistan. Each has a large herd of 
sheep, and they share grazing lands. If they share the land reasonably and 
responsibly, both can adequately maintain their flocks. Daoud could, con-
versely, try to force Omar out of the pasture so Daoud’s sheep get all the grass. 
If Omar submits without a fight, Daoud’s herd will increase by five at the 
expense of 10 of Omar’s flock, for a net loss to the community of five sheep. 
The reverse is also true. If, however, they both attempt to seize the entire 
pasture, they will get into a costly conflict. Some of their sheep will 
die from starvation, and they will have to sell others to finance their 
feud. In this eventuality, each will lose five sheep, for a net loss of 
10. The matrix in Figure 1 shows the “normal form” of the game:  
the first number listed in each cell is the change in the number of 
sheep owned by Daoud and the second number is the change in the 
number owned by Omar. 
One can quickly see that Daoud should always compete. If Omar 
is foolish enough to cooperate, then Daoud will see a gain of five 
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Figure 1: The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Matrix:  The Sheep Feud
sheep by competing. If Omar chooses to compete while Daoud remains pas-
sive, then Daoud will lose 10 of his flock to starvation in a naively benevolent 
gesture of cooperation. By competing, he still loses sheep, but he loses five 
instead of 10. The exact same logic applies to Omar. As a result, the tendency 
for both will be to compete, despite the fact that this will lead to the worst 
possible mutual outcome. This incentive structure bodes poorly for the com-
munity. The cooperate–cooperate strategy clearly offers the most total utility 
for the society in which Omar and Daoud live, but the incentive of personal 
gain will reliably drive a self-interested player to compete. So, how can society 
balance the incentive scale to ensure that it does not bear the opportunity cost 
of 10 sheep in this ill-fated conflict?
The Beauty of Punishment
The simplistic model described previously clearly does not tell the entire 
story. Although history recounts tales of horrific conflict, communities have 
managed to control violent contests between individuals or groups in order to 
build a better future for all members. Nevertheless, numerous studies across 
multiple disciplines have drawn the same conclusion:  People are not natu-
rally motivated to cooperate. They cooperate largely because society enforces 
cooperation.
Heuristically, one may assume that a person cooperates as a spontaneous 
outpouring from a kind heart. Most of us need only to look within our own 
family to see that bonds of trust and shared interests can mitigate the com-
petitive urge ascribed to the self-interested player in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Then again, everyone has heard a story or two about the time when Omar 
broke into Daoud’s piggy bank to splurge on whistle pops and comic books at 
the corner store. It does not take many incidents of cheating within a family, 
a neighborhood, or a community to erode the bonds of trust. In fact, as the 
bonds of community expand past the family and the neighborhood, the 
temptation to cheat increases in a vicious cycle.4  This leads to the “tragedy 
of the commons,” in which self-interested players pursue outcomes that 
enrich themselves in the short term but hurt the community at large for the 
long term.5
Why, then, do members of a community generally cooperate? Simply put, 
people cooperate because social institutions force them to cooperate. Even 
though Daoud sees an incentive to cheat Omar, his local shura has a clear 
interest in ensuring that he cooperates. The normal form of the game shows 
that, taken together, a society maintains its status quo through cooperation. 
The compete–cooperate and compete–compete strategies promise a loss of 
five and 10 sheep, respectively, to the community. To forestall this, 
successful societies force cooperation when it serves the interests of 
the community, by punishing those who attempt to compete.6
Fortunately, Daoud and Omar have a powerful local shura. If either 
decides to cheat the other by usurping the grazing fields, the shura 
will punish the infraction at a cost of 20 sheep. Figure 2 shows 
the new normal form of the game with a penalty of 20 sheep for 
counterproductive decisions to compete.7  In this scenario, both 
Daoud and Omar should clearly cooperate.Figure 2:  The Prisoner’s Dilemma with the Addition of Punishment
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By imposing a penalty of 20 sheep for failing to cooperate, the local shura will 
inspire productive cooperation. But, if eliciting cooperation is so simple, why 
do real people in relationships like Daoud’s and Omar’s so often choose to 
battle?
Defying Society for the Risk of Gain 
Daoud might cheat for the same reason a burglar might rob a bank: He 
thinks that he will get away with the crime. To prevent him from taking this risk, 
the local shura must maintain a good track record of punishing infractions.
Again, the normal form of the game gives insight into why the shura must 
consistently punish cheaters. If Daoud believes that he can compete without 
incurring the penalty of 20 sheep with a probability of α, his prospects change 
entirely. Daoud assumes that Omar will follow the law. Therefore, if Daoud 
cooperates, he expects no change in sheep. If he cheats, he expects to gain 
five sheep with a probability of α and to lose 15 sheep with a probability of 
1 – α. The utility of cheating is then 5α – 15(1 – α). To incentivize coopera-
tion, Daoud’s shura must make certain that he expects a better outcome from 
cooperation. Mathematically, 0 > 5α – 15(1 – α). Therefore, if Daoud believes 
that α, the probability that he will get away with cheating, is less than 75%, he 
will cooperate. Note that a stiffer penalty with the same value of α will further 
reduce Daoud’s incentive to cheat. For this reason, many shuras would take all 
of Daoud’s sheep, his favorite goat, and possibly a hand for stealing from the 
community!
Societies must keep the value of α (the chances of getting away with the 
crime) low enough to favor the community. In doing so, they encourage a 
rational Daoud to follow the rules. But sometimes societies break down. And 
with them goes the incentive to cooperate.
Captain America:  The Breaker and Builder of Societies
To emphasize the relevance of these basic incentive structures 
to current U.S. policy, consider the United States’ mission in 
Afghanistan. Growing up in rural Afghanistan, neither Daoud 
nor Omar had much vested interest in religious extremists. 
Following 9/11, however, their district’s acquiescence to the 
local Taliban militia brought hypothetical Captain America—
an extremely motivated U.S. Army company commander—to 
their village. Captain America is an expert in hybrid conflict, 
so he seamlessly transitions from breaking to building as the 
situation requires.
Initially, Captain America focuses on breaking. He controls a vast 
array of 50-caliber machine guns mounted on armored vehicles, 
automatic grenade launchers, and laser-guided missiles. Moreover, he 
has 120 motivated soldiers dedicated to eradicating the Taliban from 
every corner of the little village. In short order, Captain America has used 
his lethal weapons systems to eradicate—however temporarily—the Taliban. 
He has shown admirable discretion with his fire control measures, but the 
fighting has still taken a toll on the village. Much of the mud-engineered 
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infrastructure has crumbled from the over-pressure of 500-pound bombs, and 
the members of the village shura have gone into hiding.
Under these conditions, Daoud may now be tempted to cheat the system 
for two reasons. First, the absence of his shura might lead him to 
believe that he can get away with seizing the pasture 
from Omar without punishment. That is, he faces 
the incentive structure of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Second, he may cheat out of desperation. Assume 
that the war has truly ravaged the community and 
that Daoud’s family is living in poverty. He and his 
family will starve if he cannot gain more sheep. A despon-
dent Daoud has no choice but to compete. He knows that 
he will get no additional sheep from cooperating, so he does 
not even consider choosing this option; it leads to guaran-
teed starvation. Instead, he sends a prayer toward heaven and 
competes. He does not expect a good outcome, but it is truly 
his only chance at survival.
Fortunately, Captain America has a generous war chest for 
rebuilding the community, and he easily voids both of these 
conditions. He quickly reestablishes the shura and recon-
structs the demolished government buildings. He helps 
to finance a police force that can establish the rule of law. 
He also supports aid projects directly aimed at protecting 
Daoud and his family from starvation. In no time, 
Captain America has reestablished the pre-war status 
quo, and he should stop here.
Eager to exceed the standard and inspired by the con-
cept of money as a weapons system, however, Captain 
America takes it a step further. He initially broke the 
system through combat. In doing so, he broke the 
society’s ability to enforce cooperation. In rebuilding, 
he fulfilled his debt. Now, however, by surpassing the 
standards of restoration, he will actually break the commu-
nity through his naïve benevolence.
Breaking with Benevolence
A catastrophic loss clearly undermines the power of a community to 
enforce cooperation, but a sudden major gain similarly ruins the incen-
tive structure. Afghanistan provides a detailed case study to illustrate the 
ways in which this occurs. The primary problem with quick riches lies in 
their affect on the community’s ability to enforce punishment in dynamic 
economic systems.
Captain America meets Daoud in a shura meeting and decides that he would 
like to purchase his heart and mind. Daoud appears amicable, intelligent, 
and relatively influential in the community, so it seems perfectly logical for 
Captain America to expend his CERP (Commander’s Emergency Response 
Program) funds on Daoud’s behalf. Soon, an Afghan contractor ap-
pears and digs a well close to Daoud’s farm at a price of about $1,000, 
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an amount Daoud would never have managed on his own. Daoud is now 
perceived to have the backing of Captain America—a force far more powerful 
than his local shura. The next day, Daoud ruminates while minding his flock, 
and considers forcing Omar to accept less of the grazing grounds. Daoud is a 
big deal in the village now, as he sees it, and Omar should feel grateful to get 
any land at all for his sheep to graze. Ultimately, however, his gentler sensibili-
ties prevail, and Daoud settles for the status quo.
Over time, Daoud’s relationship with Captain America blossoms. Daoud 
always speaks in support of Captain America at the shura, and he provides 
Captain America with frequent—and occasionally accurate—reports on the 
town’s business. Daoud soon takes note of the American captain’s affinity 
for digging wells. Never a scrupulous businessman, Daoud decides to take a 
chance and calls a cousin in Kandahar who owns a drilling rig. Soon, the two 
have a booming business digging a well a week for the development-minded 
commander. Daoud starts to wonder how the community ever procured water 
prior to the infusion of benevolent aid money. While Captain America has 
purchased Daoud’s heart and mind, Daoud has followed suit, just like count-
less other Afghan contractors, and purchased a mansion on Kabul’s Street Six 
with his newly generated wealth.8 One day, Daoud decides to force Omar 
completely out, and he seizes their shared pasture. At this point, neither the 
shura nor Omar can do much to discourage this behavior.
Two factors influence the ability of a community to use punishment to force 
cooperation in this environment. First, Captain America’s implied support 
of Daoud reduces the likelihood that the shura will censure Daoud for his 
misdeeds. Second, when Daoud’s income suddenly makes herding sheep a 
pastime instead of a livelihood, he can purchase the consent of the shura with 
side payments. In the first case, a direct increase in α, the probability that 
Daoud will be able to cheat without penalty, results from his relationship with 
Captain America. In the second case, Daoud can make a side payment to 
the shura, and they will turn the other way while he steals Omar’s land. This 
hypothetical scenario paints the endemic corruption plaguing the artificially 
bloated Afghan economy in painfully vivid detail.9, 10 
In the normal form of the game, one may argue that Daoud has no incentive 
to offer a side payment to the shura. After all, if the shura confiscates 20 sheep 
as a consequence for cheating, Daoud would have to pay at least this sum 
for a modest gain of five sheep over Omar. Here, one must take careful note 
of the nature of the side payment. Daoud has gained control over the shura. 
If Daoud values this power at 15 sheep, then he breaks even. In politics, this 
type of influence carries a value far greater than 15 sheep and a dozen camels. 
In fact, at this point in the game, Daoud really does not even care about the 
sheep. Usurping the power of the shura is the prize that he seeks.
Prior to the change in his status from a common sheep farmer to a powerful 
businessman, Daoud did not have the wherewithal to buy influence because 
he needed the sheep that he gained through cooperation to support his family. 
He simply did not have the capital to invest in the political machine. More-
over, a wise shura takes its bribes under careful consideration. If things should 
go badly for a conspiring member of the shura, Daoud’s deep pockets and 
cozy relationship with Captain America would help smooth things over. Prior 
to his accumulation of wealth, Daoud could not have mitigated these risks.
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Daoud’s display of power incurs some risk as well. He must ensure that Omar 
has enough sheep to survive so that he does not become desperate, which 
might lead to a direct confrontation between the two. With Daoud as the 
power broker, the game structure mirrors that of warlord politics. In it, Daoud 
represents a strong player and Omar represents a weak player.11 A strong 
Daoud has a dominant strategy of competing, yielding a submissive Omar. 
Daoud simply must not allow Omar to sink into the realm of despair, because 
if Omar does, then Daoud will face a belligerent and desperate opponent. 
Omar has little chance of defeating Daoud, but if confrontation is his only 
chance of survival, he will unquestionably take the risk. A dominant strategy 
of conflict emerges in this circumstance. Fortunately, Daoud can evade this 
dynamic. 
Daoud now controls the resources throughout his village, and if Omar needs 
some sheep, Daoud can easily afford to act as the benevolent dictator in return 
for continued submissive support. Should the community meet with utter 
calamity, so that everyone needs more sheep than Daoud can provide, he has 
nimbly and wisely hedged his bets with his Kabul residence. In all likelihood, 
Daoud moved his wife and kids to Kabul long ago. The guarantee of a perma-
nent change of scenery and a comfortable early retirement ensure that Daoud 
will continue to usurp power within his community without fear.
Although Captain America certainly bought the heart and mind of Daoud, 
and was able to report impressive non-lethal aid numbers to his higher 
headquarters, he simultaneously had an immeasurably negative impact on the 
culture of mutually beneficial cooperation within his area of responsibility. 
Daoud, Omar, and their lineage of ancestors survived without Captain 
America’s wells. Because he failed to understand the true needs of the village 
or the effects of superfluous cash on an economy concerned with grazing 
sheep, Captain America nullified the community’s ability to use punishment 
as a means for evading the pitfall of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Captain America’s Lesson
Aid money plays a crucial role in a war zone. Yet, the United States seems to 
advocate spreading money around as a way for its commanders to buy sup-
port. While Captain America purchased the support of Daoud, he destroyed 
the shura—and the community that depended on it—in the process. Instead 
of using money as a weapons system to buy friends, Captain America should 
have used just enough aid to restore power to the community government 
and to avert catastrophic loss. Investments beyond this sweet spot may curry 
favor with a minority of the community, but they do not build an enduring, 
self-reliant society.
Admittedly, some circumstances do call for buying friends. When the United 
States engages in this type of behavior, it must do so with clear-eyed realism 
regarding the negative effects that using money as a weapons system has on 
indigenous communities. Current Army doctrine gives little consideration to 
this phenomenon, which helps explain the current state of affairs in Afghani-
stan. We can imagine that every new mansion springing up in Kabul’s 
suburbs memorializes a dying community shura in the heart of the Afghan 
conflict.  
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Estonia’s Forest Brothers in 1941: Goals, Capabilities, and Outcomes
CPT Olavi Punga, Estonian Army Immediately after the Soviet Union’s occupation and annexation 
of Estonia in June 1940, Estonians commenced various types of resistance, 
both passive and open, against this foreign power. In the context of the con-
ventional warfare that prevailed in the 20th century, the resistance that arose 
in Estonia, culminating in the summer of 1941 as the German invasion of the 
Soviet Union commenced, was viewed by Soviet historians as an inseparable 
part of World War II (or, as it was officially known in the Soviet Union, 
the Great Patriotic War). Estonians, in contrast, referred to the anti-Soviet 
resistance in 1941 as the Summer War and called the participants the Forest 
Brothers.
The Soviet Union never officially recognized the Summer War as such for two 
reasons. First, in the Soviet theory of warfare, the theoretical premises for the 
type of irregular warfare carried out by the Forest Brothers had been dismissed.1 
Second, the Soviet political system cultivated the idea that Estonia had volun-
tarily joined the Soviet Union in 1940. The Estonian refugees who were exiled 
from their homeland during and after World War II took the memory of the 
Summer War with them, but later research on this topic has been fairly limited. 
That is why the Summer War has so far been a subject of research primarily 
for Estonian historians, who have published their works in Estonian. The term 
Forest Brothers, commonly used in Estonian literature, has been overshadowed 
in Soviet or Soviet-biased literature by the use of more general terms such as 
guerrilla or partisan. 
The year of the first Soviet occupation of Estonia caused a small but gradually 
increasing number of Estonians throughout the country to withdraw from 
society and go into hiding. They were soon referred to as the Forest Brothers. 
For several days beginning on 14 June 1941, the Peoples’ Commissariat for 
Internal Affairs (or Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del, abbreviated NKVD) 
deported thousands of people thought to be “anti-Soviet elements” from 
Estonia.2 More Estonians reacted by becoming fugitives, hiding in the forests 
and marshes to escape any subsequent deportations.3
The Influence of the Forest Brothers on the Conduct  
of War
The activities of the Forest Brothers against the Soviet government and its 
representatives varied greatly, from pranks to well-planned military actions 
directed against local collaborators and Red Army units. The intensity of the 
Forest Brothers’ activities varied over time, depending largely on the local 
situation and reflecting the influence of the larger German–Soviet conflict.  
The idea of combat activities without a clearly defined front was unknown 
to the Red Army at the time. Both its leadership and rank and file were 
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unprepared for such warfare, and the Forest Brothers’ 
irregular tactics initially caused confusion and panic in the 
Red Army. It is possible that activities conducted by the 
local Forest Brothers were the main reason that the head-
quarters of the Soviet Eighth Army, which had retreated 
to Estonia following the initial German attack of Opera-
tion Barbarossa, was forced to leave the Suure-Kambja 
area in Tartumaa on 6 July 1941. The headquarters was 
relocated to the north, four kilometers from Põltsamaa, 
which had been assaulted by the local Forest Brothers 
two days earlier. On the same day, Lieutenant General 
F. Ivanov ordered the Soviet 11th Rifle Division to “most 
ruthlessly clear the Army’s rear area of bandit and diver-
sion groups.”4 Despite the large number of Soviet units 
that were engaged in these missions against the Forest 
Brothers, however, Red Army soldiers who fled to the 
rear later explained that they abandoned their positions 
because they feared being surrounded, even though the 
German forces were still far away.
It is important to understand the position of the Estonians as Germany began 
its invasion of the USSR. After a year of “Sovietization” and terror, Estonian 
civil society was virtually destroyed. The German invasion gave people hope 
for relief from Soviet terror and for the restoration of Estonian statehood. 
But this did not mean the Forest Brothers gave unconditional support to 
the German forces. Rather, the Forest Brothers viewed the Wehrmacht as a 
temporary ally in their mutual fight against the Soviet Union.
The Soviet forces that either were stationed in or had retreated to Estonia, as 
well as the local “red” activists, went through a very intense period of combat 
from 4–12 July 1941, due to the various resistance operations conducted by 
the Forest Brothers. During this period, as panicked Communist activists and 
refugees fled before the oncoming German forces, Pärnu, Valga, Võru, Sakala, 
and Tartumaa counties came under the Forest Brothers’ partial or complete 
control, even before the advancing German forces reached these areas.5 
North of the Pärnu–Emajõe line, numerous small and large battles took place 
between the Forest Brothers and various Soviet military units. In the middle 
of July 1941, an operational pause descended on the war in Estonia, a pause 
that changed the character of the Summer War. An increase in the number of 
Soviet units fighting against them, as well as more efficient counterinsurgency 
operations, temporarily stalled the Forest Brothers’ hitherto extremely active 
armed resistance. The Forest Brothers in the northern parts of Sakala and 
Tartumaa counties, located in the Soviet close rear, suffered heavy losses, 
caused mostly by NKVD operational units and so-called destruction battalions, 
and Red Army battalions that had been withdrawn from Latvia and southern 
Estonia. 
Once the Soviet units had recovered from their retreat and the initial confu-
sion caused by the Forest Brothers’ attacks, the new commander of the Eighth 
Army and the newly appointed rear guard commander were able to reestablish 
command and control over their units. At the same time, the Red Baltic Fleet 
established contact with the Eighth Army. Subsequently, most Soviet forces 
in Estonia managed to establish communications and improve cooperation 
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and attempted to seize the initiative in their counterinsurgency operations. 
The rear guard forces were directed to support the missions assigned to the 
Army units. In addition, agent networks were established with the purpose of 
gathering information about the locations of the Forest Brothers’ units, and 
plans to search and locate insurgents in specific areas were put into action. 
The number of patrols and guard posts was increased to protect vital com-
munication assets, while border guard detachments, railroad security units, 
operational units, and the destruction battalions, all under the command of 
the NKVD, assumed concrete areas of responsibility.6
The countermeasures undertaken by the Soviet forces increased the number of 
armed contacts with the resistance fighters, but these actions had no significant 
influence on the numbers or fighting will of the Forest Brothers. The Forest 
Brothers in Harjumaa and Järvamaa counties, caught by a larger operation 
of the Soviet rear guard forces that was intended to destroy a reconnaissance 
group sent in from Finland, were affected more than the others. In general, 
the Soviet rear guard units were successful in a limited number of operations 
in which one or more of the following was true:
 ¡ the exact location of the Forest Brothers was known from intelligence 
or agent network information;
 ¡ military tracking dogs were used in searches;
 ¡ the Forest Brothers did not cover their tracks sufficiently; and
 ¡ the Soviets gained the cooperation of local civilians through various 
methods, including torture.
 The Soviets gained the 
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These photos show a group of Forest Brothers from Rägavere 
parish in Virumaa county, northeastern Estonia, taken in 
July 1941 at the height of the resistance movement.
Ownership of a personal radio or a weapon meant 
immediate arrest and subsequent punishment, varying 
from interrogations to execution on the spot.
The Goals of the Forest Brothers
The people who took refuge in the forests were by no means adventurers or 
“Wild West” outlaws. Nor were they like the ideological heroes of Soviet 
propaganda films. They were common folk, and probably only a very small 
fraction of them had a full understanding of the war raging in their country. A 
person did not become a Forest Brother based on orders or political guidance; 
it was simply his (or sometimes her) own choice. Estonians’ options were lim-
ited to enduring the oppression of the new system, moving or being moved to 
Russia under Soviet authority, or hiding in Estonia as a Forest Brother.
There were different reasons for supporting or living as a Forest Brother, 
but the most important reason was a desire to avoid the heavy hand of the 
occupying power and thus survive. By isolating themselves from general 
society, it was possible for the Forest Brothers to avoid the direct oppression 
of the Soviets, but they had no guarantees for their continued survival. They 
considered the possession of firearms to be their only solid assurance. A lack 
of weapons was the impetus for the initial actions carried out by the Forest 
Brothers. They used all possible means to arm themselves, such as purchasing 
guns from hunters, exchanging weapons for vodka with the militsia (Soviet 
police force), stealing a rifle or pistol from a sleeping soldier, as well as at-
tacking individual soldiers. Once armed, the Forest Brothers were ready to 
defend themselves and their loved ones, as well as their property. The majority 
of activities conducted by the Forest Brothers served the sole purpose of saving 
lives and private property. Many people who joined the Forest Brothers, 
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 To survive, the Forest Brothers needed to be able to travel 
openly and blend in with ordinary people. This explains their 
neat and orderly appearance despite living life on the run.
This particular group was relatively well armed and 
equipped, as shown by the bicycles and the radio. 
however, were motivated by their desire to resist the enemy—not just the Red 
Army but all representatives of the occupation regime. In general, the Forest 
Brothers fought with these two primary purposes: to defend themselves and to 
resist the Soviet occupiers. For these small, scattered guerilla units, trying for a 
larger goal such as destroying the occupying forces would have been suicidal.
Military Capabilities
It is very difficult to give even a general overview of the Forest Brothers’ 
military capabilities. The main factor that determined which skills would be 
developed was the presence of personnel with relevant military experience and 
the capability to lead. Among the Forest Brothers, however, nobody had any 
special training in the conduct of war in the enemy’s rear, or in the environ-
ment of guerrilla warfare. Former members of the military, border guards, 
and Kaitseliit (the militia-based Estonian Defense League, founded in 1918 to 
protect Estonian independence) were the best prepared.
The Forest Brothers lacked a higher command element and a larger structure 
(on the county or national level). This lack had both positive and negative 
effects for them. For example, when any member of the Forest Brothers was 
captured, the enemy couldn’t extract the necessary information, even by tor-
ture, that would lead to the capture or destruction of others. On the negative 
side, however, the Forest Brothers were unable to bring together a sufficient 
level of manpower and firepower to take over any significant population 
centers, to disrupt the activities of the destruction battalions, or undertake 
other such large-scale operations. This weakness was exacerbated by the Forest 
Brothers’ poor armaments and minimal means of transportation, as well as a 
lack of access to timely information.
Nevertheless, the Forest Brothers’ lack of organization, varying unit sizes, and 
uneven levels of armament meant that the Red Army rarely knew the capa-
bility of the unit it was facing. Consequently, the Soviets rarely were able to 
assemble the appropriate forces to counter the Forest Brothers’ units.
The source materials describing the Forest Brothers’ activities include several 
ambiguous terms describing the size of their formations:  group, band, and 
camp. While these are all common appellations, they are vague in terms of 
indicating actual personnel strength, firepower, command and control struc-
ture, and combat capabilities. Based on incomplete data, the total number of 
Forest Brothers has been estimated at around 12,000. Compared with national 
armies at that time, this would have been roughly equivalent to the size of 
an infantry division, but the Forest Brothers were scattered in small groups 
across the countryside. Considering the partial or sometimes complete lack 
of command and control, armaments, training, and supporting structures, 
the overall combat capabilities of the Forest Brothers could not have been 
very high. But this is only in the context of conventional warfare. The simple 
lack of reliable, good-quality weapons and adequate ammunition were the 
most common reasons for the Forest Brothers’ failures in battles. The main 
strengths of the Forest Brothers were their loose organization, their ability to 
blend into the environment, and the rest of Estonian society’s overall positive 
attitude towards them.
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As a rule, guerrilla tactics do not differ greatly from those of conventional 
small military units. The Forest Brothers implemented some tactics that 
were more or less adapted from the Estonian Defense Forces’ doctrine. The 
decentralized nature of the Forest Brothers’ units and the loose connections 
between key personnel meant that when a unit of Forest Brothers faced an 
armed confrontation, it would be able to disperse without significant casual-
ties, or to escape encirclement by breaking into smaller groups. The unit later 
reassembled elsewhere or simply moved to another area. The Forest Brothers 
themselves referred to this technique as evaporation tactics:  “to disappear from 
a battle they had started at the right moment in order to disrupt the enemy by 
opening fire from another direction.”7 This tactic underlay the sustainability of 
the camp or group-centered structure of the Forest Brothers.
Outcomes of the Forest Brothers’ Activities
One of the most significant outcomes of the Forest Brothers’ resistance was 
the disruption of Red Army movements and government communications: 
road blocks, ambushes, and blown-up bridges made railways and highways 
impassable, while phone lines were cut to slow or prevent the transmission 
of orders and information. These attacks not only affected the Red Army’s 
command and control capabilities, but also limited the activities of the local 
Soviet-controlled governing bodies. 
Initially, the goal of the Forest Brothers in cutting phone lines was to disrupt 
the activities of local officials. Later, when the repair crews were assigned 
armed escorts, the disruptions were mostly used to acquire weapons from 
these escorts. Before 1941, the communication lines of the Soviet Baltic 
Special Military District units in Estonia were based on the local phone lines, 
and even when the war commenced in June 1941, radio communication was 
almost never used. For this reason, operations by the Forest Brothers to de-
stroy phone lines sometimes caused a complete communications blackout in 
several areas, and forced the Soviet units to deploy significant forces to secure 
their communication lines. The attacks disrupted not only communications 
between the Northwestern Front and the Eighth Army headquarters, but also 
command and control over the Eighth Army and Red Baltic Fleet fighting 
units.
In another bid to acquire weapons, the Forest Brothers also attacked various 
Red Army air surveillance posts, successfully in most cases. These attacks 
resulted in serious disruptions and gaps in the early warning system of the 
Tallinn air defense network.
On the level of their individual lives, the Forest Brothers were largely suc-
cessful. Out of more than 12,000 Forest Brothers, only 561 have been con-
firmed as killed. This means that at least 11,439 Forest Brothers survived and 
escaped the regime’s oppressions in 1941.8 What is even more important is that 
while in hiding they felt safe from the reach of the Soviet terror. On a group 
level, the Forest Brothers minimized the reach and results of several Soviet-
organized repression campaigns. For example, they were able to significantly 
impede the mobilization of conscripts and reservists, forced evacuations, the 
use of common people in building defensive positions, and requisitions of 
farm animals and agricultural products.
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There have been several statements concerning the use of scorched earth 
tactics by the Red Army in Estonia in 1941. Compared to the destruction that 
occurred in Russia during the Soviets’ retreat from the advancing German 
army, such claims don’t apply in Estonia’s case. When Stalin gave the order 
over the radio to utilize scorched earth tactics across the Soviet Union, the 
main idea was to destroy anything and everything that could aid the enemy. 
In Estonia, much was destroyed, but not everything. This outcome raises 
some questions. First, why were Stalin’s orders not fully obeyed in Estonia? 
Second, what or who may have interfered with the execution orders? Third, 
who or what could have prevented the Red Army throughout Estonia from 
obeying Stalin’s orders? There were too few Estonian Communists, and they 
lacked any authority or power over the Red Army to prevent it from acting 
on those orders. The advancing German units moved quite fast, but even they 
could not reach everywhere fast enough to prevent destruction. The evidence 
points to the Forest Brothers, who guarded their own and their neighbors’ 
households and attempted to prevent the retreating Red Army units from 
wreaking havoc.
Epilogue:  German Occupation
The more active units of the Estonian resistance tried to continue their fight 
for the complete liberation of their homeland, even after the Wehrmacht 
had reached the territory already liberated from Soviet control by the Forest 
Brothers. Along the Pärnu–Emajõe front, former Forest Brothers participated 
in direct combat against the Red Army until the German reserves arrived. 
After that, most of the self-formed Forest Brothers’ units were simply dis-
banded by the Germans, as only Germans were allowed to fight under arms 
on the front. Only in a few cases were former Forest Brothers permitted to 
participate in combat as a unit, usually to counter intensified resistance put 
up by the Red Army or to reinforce insufficient German forces in a particular 
sector.
A handful of less active Forest Brothers continued to live in the forest for days 
after the front had passed through, before they were informed of the change 
of power from Soviet to German hands. Most Forest Brothers gradually 
followed the front, leaving the forests and going home. After the reoccupation 
of Estonia by the Red Army in 1944, many of those Forest Brothers who had 
engaged in resistance against the Soviet power in 1941 were persecuted, and 
many, with their families, were exiled to Siberia.
Closing Remarks
It was common in the Soviet Union to characterize the Estonian Forest 
Brothers in the context of World War II as supporters of Germany. The main 
logic behind this (and in some instances, the historical interpretation of 
Russian historians today) was simple:  Because the Forest Brothers were the 
opponents of the Soviet regime, they were supporters of Germany. This logic 
was also supported by descriptions of the Forest Brothers’ activities recorded 
during the war.9 However, as Estonian historians repeatedly highlight, there 
are important flaws in this train of thought. Estonians did not support 
Germans or the official fascist ideology of Germany. Instead, they saw the 
Germans as liberators from the Soviet occupation and its oppressions, and 
thus as their allies against the Soviet Union.
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Consequently, the topic of the Forest Brothers has been a favorite subject in 
Soviet propaganda from World War II to recent times. Connecting the Esto-
nian Forest Brothers to one of the warring parties in World War II enabled 
Soviet propagandists to apply derogatory labels, such as traitors of the father-
land, bandits, or criminals, in order to smear the Forest Brothers’ name. In 
modern days, the term terrorists has also been added. This is just one example 
of how the history of the Soviet occupation has been distorted for the sake 
of propaganda. The authors and supporters of such statements demonstrate a 
poor knowledge of history and of military operations.
Following the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the first War of Chechnya, 
in 1997 the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Interior Forces Headquarters 
conducted a joint large-scale study on small wars. In one of its findings, the 
study highlighted the need for small war theory to be reinstated in the Russian 
military’s formal “science of war.” This step gives us hope that perhaps, one 
day, the Forest Brothers will be viewed as equal to guerrillas and partisans, 
and the Summer War will be on equal footing with other small wars. Such a 
change is not needed to enhance the dignity of those who participated or were 
killed; it would, however, allow historians to draw more fair and objective 
conclusions based on the theory of unconventional warfare.  
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NOTES
1 The status of small war theory was not reinstated in Russian 
military doctrine until 1997.
2 For the most comprehensive and succinct overview, see Andres 
Kasekamp, A History of the Baltic States (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 130–131.
3 The Forest Brothers’ activity from 1940 to 1941 can be divided 
into three periods. 
 
21 June 1940–14 June 1941. This was the “hiding” 
period, during which those who had gone into the forests lay low. 
Not many people actually went into hiding at this time. For a 
law-abiding citizen, the thought of leaving one’s home and living 
like a hunted beast was an almost insurmountable psychological 
obstacle. In the beginning of June 1941, there were a few outlaw 
individuals or small groups in the Estonian forests, but they had 
no central organization or information network at the time. This 
year-long period is characterized by an almost complete lack of 
activity. 
 
14–22 June 1941. This was the “waiting” or “confusion” period, 
and coincides with the beginning of the war on the Eastern front. 
Everything changed overnight after 14 June, when more than 
10,000 Estonians—including entire families—were deported 
from their homes by the Soviets. The sudden deportations 
terrorized Estonian society and were immediately followed by a 
mass flight of citizens from their homes. This eight-day period 
saw:  
 
- the emergence of larger resistance groups and the first forest 
camps; 
 - the organization of armed resistance; and 
 - the beginnings of active resistance by a few groups immediately 
after the deportations began. 
 
22 June–30 August 1941. Third was the “active attacks” period. 
This period saw the end of active guerrilla combat on the 
mainland, although fighting continued on the Estonian islands.
4 ERA R–358-1-17, l 77; Eesti rahvas Nõukogude Liidu Suures 
Isamaasõjas 1941–1945. Dokumente ja materjale. Tallinn 1975, 
dok. nr 42: “Kaitse organiseerimisest Pärnu-Viljandi-Tartu 
joonel. 8. armee lahingukäsk. 6. juuli 1941.”
5 Different levels of the Soviet power structure were struck by 
several panic waves in early July 1941. Caused primarily by 
command and leadership issues, the ensuing chaos made the 
situation in Estonia even more complicated. The first wave 
involved mostly local-level Communist activists, between 3–6 
July. The masses of retreating units and refugees from Latvia 
caused tremendous disruption, which was further aggravated by 
the evacuation of the local Communist functionaries and their 
families. At the same time, the Forest Brothers became active 
as well, driven by the general lack of command and leadership, 
and the distribution of arms to the local Executive Committees. 
They carried out several serious attacks against Soviet lines of 
communication and some towns where Communists were living. 
 
The confusion caused by the first wave was dying down when 
a clearly distinguishable second wave of panic arose. The Forest 
Brothers’ activities in the southern part of Pärnumaa County 
enabled German forces to quickly seize control of Pärnu on 8 
July. This caused a serious upheaval among almost all Soviet 
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command and armed forces in Estonia. The Baltic Fleet’s 
War Council and its headquarters escaped to their ships, and 
the most critical fighting units were evacuated to Kronstadt. 
Consequently, the capabilities of the fleet in the area of 
operations was significantly reduced. The government of the 
Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic tried to escape to Russia 
via Narva. The ESSR War Commissar and his subordinates 
also fled Estonia. The panic wound down by 14 July.
6 The NKVD assigned the following areas of responsibility to units 
charged with the destruction of the Forest Brothers: 
- the 6th Border Guard detachment: the territory from Estonia’s 
northern coastline up to 22 km inland; 
- the 109th Regiment of the 2nd Division of the Railway Guard 
troops: 7 km–wide zones along the main railroads in cooperation 
with the respective destruction battalions in the area; and 
- the commander of the NKVD Operational Group of 
destruction battalions: the remaining Estonian territory, with 
military objectives of strategic importance being the first priority.
7 Eesti rahva kannatuste aasta, lk. 336. Tallinn, 1995.
8 To be clear, while they may have escaped persecution or death 
in 1941, this does not mean that all of them were able to escape 
when the Soviets came back in 1944. See COL Martin Herem’s 
article, “The Strategy and Activity of the Forest Brothers: 
1947–1950,” in this issue of CTX.
9 The main sources for research on the Forest Brothers’ movement 
are the descriptions of activities and interrogation protocols from 
the two occupations: Soviet and German. The main differences, 
but also the main similarities, are in the presentation of the Forest 
Brothers’ activities based on a certain ideology and from a specific 
viewpoint. During the German occupation, the Forest Brothers 
were seen in a positive manner, influenced by the prevailing 
anti-Soviet ideology. The sources recorded during the Soviet 
occupations showed the Forest Brothers, or people connected 
to them, as a priori guilty and thus subject to condemnation, 
regardless of their real activities.
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JORSS was only a small part 
of the anti-Soviet resistance 
following World War II, and 
it shared most of the larger 
movement’s characteristics.
The Strategy and Activity of the Forest Brothers: 1947–1950
Colonel Martin Herem, Estonian 
Defense Forces
The Forest Brothers’ resistance movement in post–world war II 
Estonia is a topic that has received quite a lot of attention in recent literature, 
from many different perspectives.2 At the same time, no study has been 
published so far that examines the Forest Brothers’ activities as a military 
operation. Such research is, at first sight, made difficult by the shortage of 
source materials, as well as the general opinion that the Estonian Forest 
Brothers were not an organized movement. Furthermore, the failure of their 
campaign—the defeat of the Forest Brothers and Estonia’s domination by 
the Soviet Union—may indicate to some that there is little to be learned. 
Nevertheless, with regard to Estonia’s national defense as well as the current 
campaigns against international terrorism, it is important to understand the 
reasons behind the ultimate failure of the Forest Brothers.
This article looks at the Forest Brothers during their most active period of re-
sistance, from 1947 to 1950. In those years, a resistance fighter named Richard 
Saaliste, along with his brother and three other men, played a key part in 
the strategic preparations for a hoped-for outbreak of war between the USSR 
and the Western countries. Their strategy will henceforward be referred to, 
for brevity’s sake, as the JORSS strategy. JORSS—an acronym of the surnames 
Jerlet, Oras, Raadik, Saaliste, Saaliste—was used by the resistance fighters as 
a radiogram signature in their attempts to establish communication with the 
Western countries.3 
The aim of this article is to evaluate the JORSS strategy and the reasons behind 
the initial successes and ultimate failure of the Forest Brothers who tried to 
implement it, by considering the resistance movement in the context of Esto-
nian society at the time. This context is taken to include the society, population, 
economy, and culture of the Estonian SSR, as well as the anti-resistance activities 
of the Soviet authorities. Changes in the environment that had an effect on the 
strategy of the resistance movement are another facet of the evaluation. This 
method of evaluation, applied here to the Forest Brothers, is adapted from 
the study “How Men Rebel: An Organizational Model for Insurgency,” 
by William Bender and Craig L. Johnson (hereafter, Bender-Johnson), 
which describes a method for evaluating resistance movements based on the 
authors’ examination of several theories on organization and resistance.4 This 
article, in turn, is a brief outline of the author’s master’s thesis, which applied 
the Bender-Johnson method to a far more detailed case study of the Forest 
Brothers.5
General Characteristics of the Estonian Rebellion: 
1944–1953
As mentioned previously, JORSS was only a small part of the anti-Soviet 
resistance that spread across Eastern Europe following World War II, and it 
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shared most of the larger movement’s characteristics. The Soviet occupation of 
the Republic of Estonia in 1940, a result of the Molotov–Ribbentrop non-
aggression pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, inspired two 
stages of the Forest Brothers’ movement: from 1940 to 1941, and from 1944 
to 1953. Both of these stages were characterized by an armed resistance move-
ment in support of an anticipated invasion by the United States and European 
countries. What made the second stage different, however, was the fact that 
there was no active warfare as such going on from 1945; instead, the resistance 
was fuelled by the hope for a new onset of war. Estonians in the post-war years 
had many reasons to hide and fight against the Soviet regime. In 1940–1941 
they had endured the Soviet reign of terror that followed occupation. That 
experience impelled thousands of Estonians to volunteer to serve in the 
German armed forces’ Home Guard during the German occupation. And that 
in turn was reason enough for them to go into the forest and incite rebellion 
when the Soviet forces came back in 1944. 
Regardless of the number of people who took part in the resistance movement 
in different periods, and the activity of the Forest Brothers as evaluated by 
various methods, the entire Forest Brothers’ movement must be regarded as 
an ideological conflict between Soviet rule and the citizens of the occupied 
territory. In documents on the Forest Brothers from the USSR Committee 
for State Security (the secret police), the movement is commonly described 
as nationalist banditry, a bourgeois nationalist underground resistance 
movement, and a profoundly nationalist underground resistance movement 
directed at vigorous anti-Soviet operations.6 The “political banditry”7 of the 
western regions of the USSR was thus distinguished in official documents 
from the “criminal banditry” of people’s struggle for material survival in the 
rest of the Soviet republics, even by the Soviet authorities themselves.8 Even 
though the resistance movements in post-war Ukraine, Lithuania, and Latvia 
were substantially more widespread, active, and organized, the Estonian 
Forest Brothers must not be underestimated due to their lack of organization. 
Although they were eradicated, and no broader resistance movement existed 
in Estonia as far as we know, the Forest Brothers deserve a place in the theory 
of resistance. In Mao Zedong’s three-stage theory of guerrilla warfare, the 
post-war Forest Brothers’ movement falls under the first stage: the creation of 
an organization that encompasses a conflict of ideologies, armed fighters, and 
a purpose for the resistance.9
The post–World War II Forest Brothers’ movement has been divided into 
periods by several authors. Most agree on the years 1944–1945, which were 
characterized by the ongoing war in Europe and quite a large number of 
men—estimated at 15,000–20,000—hiding in the forest. This number 
represents more than 1% of the population at the time.10 During the second 
period, 1945–1949, the anti-Soviet activities of the Forest Brothers were more 
dynamic and better organized. The last period of active armed resistance is 
considered to be the interval from the March deportation of 1949 until 1953, 
during which the major groups of Forest Brothers were eliminated.11 
The casualties on both sides, Forest Brothers and Soviets (including civil-
ians), show the intensity of the conflict. A total of 1,870 armed contacts were 
recorded during these years. Seventy-four percent of them were directed by 
the resistance fighters against civilian supporters of the occupation, collective 
farms, and other public entities.12 A closer study of the victims usually reveals 
The Forest Brothers’ movement 
must be regarded as an 
ideological conflict between 
Soviet rule and the citizens 
of the occupied territory.
Although they were eradicated, 
the Forest Brothers deserve a 
place in the theory of resistance.
40
CTX | Vol. 3, No. 3
a common reason:  revenge against informants and other collaborators who 
harmed Estonian civilians or the Forest Brothers themselves.13 According 
to these records, the Forest Brothers killed 1,009 people associated with the 
Soviet regime:  49% civilians, 29% Soviet activists and voluntary members of 
destruction battalions, 12% members of the security forces, 5% civilians coop-
erating with the Soviet security forces, and 5% military personnel. The Forest 
Brothers’ losses during these nine years totaled 16,620 people: 1,495 killed and 
9,870 arrested, while another 5,255 surrendered.14 Many of those who were 
arrested or who surrendered were punished by death or sent to Siberia. The 
intensity of the resistance was relatively high for such a short period of time. 
More than a thousand people killed in 1,870 attacks over nine years is not a 
big number in itself, but it is striking when compared to some other modern 
insurgent movements.15
JORSS Strategy and Structure
The most important person behind JORSS was Richard Saaliste, one of the 
best-known leaders of the Forest Brothers. Saaliste was a farmer and reserve 
officer in 1940 when the Soviet Union first occupied Estonia. By 1941, he 
had fled into the forest and begun his struggle against the Soviet occupation. 
Like thousands of other Estonians during the German occupation, Saaliste 
joined the Home Guard, where he served as a battalion commander. He was 
wounded twice and in 1944 escaped to Sweden. 
In late 1946, Saaliste returned to Estonia, a move that was extremely unusual. 
The exact reasons behind his return are still unclear. On the one hand, he was 
performing a task, assigned by Estonians leaders in Sweden, to arrange for the 
evacuation of certain individuals to Sweden. On the other hand, he began to 
make contact with the Forest Brothers right after his arrival back in Estonia. 
Researchers have discussed a possible connection with the intelligence services 
of some Western countries, but such contacts have never been proved. Other 
key personnel of JORSS could be called “career Forest Brothers,” using the ter-
minology of the Soviet security services. These men were declared outlaws in 
1944 or 1945, were not organized on more than a group level up to that point, 
and, somewhat surprisingly, had no civilian blood on their hands. All of them, 
however, had battle experience from service in the German army. 
It is significant that the JORSS boycotted the strongest Estonian resistance 
organization at this time:  the Armed Resistance Union (RVL). The RVL had 
a hierarchical structure and recruited members, 
including civilians in legal positions, with the 
objective of restoring an independent Estonian 
republic. Like JORSS, they understood that the res-
toration of an independent state would be possible 
only with the direct support of Western countries. 
But JORSS regarded a formal anti-Soviet organiza-
tion as necessary only when the international 
situation, i.e., a commitment to armed interven-
tion from the West, warranted it.16 Until then, the 
preparatory organizational work had to be carried 
out. Hence, JORSS leaders disagreed with the RVL’s 
principles of operation, although their anti-Soviet 
objectives were the same.17 They believed that the 
Many of the Forest Brothers 
who were arrested or who 
surrendered were punished 
by death or sent to Siberia.
The Forest Brothers believed 
that the Armed Resistance 
Union, with its conventional 
organizational structure, 
was doomed to failure.
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RVL, with its conventional organizational structure, was doomed to failure 
from the moment of its creation, and would be discovered by the MGB (as 
the Soviet secret police were known at the time) very soon. JORSS leaders, in 
contrast, opposed any formal registration of the members of the organization, 
whether through lists, forms, or symbols. They were against including legal 
citizens in the organization, who might want to restrict the activity of the 
Forest Brothers with organizational principles, and regarded such activity by 
the leadership of the RVL as mistaken. 
The Strategy 
The objective of the JORSS strategy was to win support among the Forest 
Brothers and the general population for the overthrow of Soviet rule in the 
Estonian SSR, in the event of a war between the Western countries and the 
Soviet Union. In other words, the JORSS strategy was based on anticipation 
of a political or military intervention by the Western countries. This was a 
common strategic feature of the resistance groups in all three Baltic states. 
None of the resistance movements aimed at overthrowing Soviet rule on 
its own, but presumed that an intervention by countries hostile to Moscow 
would end the occupation of the Baltic states.18 This hope was fed daily 
through anti-Soviet propaganda in the news media, including Western radio 
services from Italy, Switzerland, Turkey, and Sweden, Radio Rias from the 
U.S. zone in Germany, Voice of America Moscow, Estonian programs in 
German, and anti-Soviet programs on the BBC. In addition, Saaliste had with 
him some newspapers issued by Estonian expatriates in Germany and Sweden 
promoting this idea. 
What made the JORSS strategy different were a few details, especially with 
regard to the organizational structure. The best way to explain the strategy is 
with a widely used method that focuses on the objective, desired outcomes, 
methods of achieving those outcomes, and resources (see Table 1).19 
The JORSS strategy was based 
on anticipation of a political 
or military intervention by 
the Western countries.
Ends Ways Means Risk
The Forest Brothers 
are prepared for 
combat upon 
the outbreak of 
war between the 
Western countries 
and the USSR.
The survival of the Forest 
Brothers and their weaponry by 
stealth. 
Contact between groups for the 
purpose of mobilizing the Forest 
Brothers. 
Provisioning with the help 
of supporters and through 
confiscation. 
A loosely structured organization 
for the sake of security. 
Long-term instructions to 
coordinate the activity of 
different groups.
Existing Forest Brothers.




Supporters in the form of 
local inhabitants. 
State institutions.
Discipline and morale of 
the Forest Brothers. 
Acceptance: The Soviet 
authorities do not accede 
and respond with violence.
Acceptance/feasibility:  The 
support of the inhabitants 
is crucial (they accept as 
long as they can see the 





of war by the Western 
countries changes the 
strategy as a whole.
Table 1.  The JORSS Strategy:  Ends, Ways, and Means
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A characteristic feature of the Forest Brothers was the structure of JORSS. First 
of all, it should be clarified that it was not an organization in the common 
sense. The Forest Brothers themselves denied the existence of any such 
organization. During an interrogation in 1952, V. Oras claimed that the group 
only went so far as to make preparations for establishing a Forest Brothers’ 
organization when the situation was right, i.e., once a war was underway. 
This may be a little disingenuous:  even a relatively unstructured group can 
indeed be called an organization, if an organization is understood to consist of 
a knowingly coordinated social union that is an identifiable entity and works 
steadily towards a common goal.
Judging by the statements of the Forest Brothers themselves, the organization 
even had a structure that covered all of Estonia. According to that structure, 
Ends Ways Means Risk
The Estonian 
population can be 
mobilized for an 
armed uprising 
against Soviet rule 
at the outbreak 
of war, while 
mobilization by the 
USSR is obstructed.
Information operations to explain 
the objectives of the Forest 
Brothers’ activities, the criminal 
nature of Soviet rule, and the 
international political situation.
Taking into account the interests 
of the population. 
Clarifying the objectives by means 
of actions (armed attacks on 
Soviet representatives and sites).
Identifying members of the 
general population suited for 
mobilization (physical capability, 
attitude). 
Arming the population for 
mobilization with outside help. 
Leaflets, brochures. 
Facilities for compiling 
media. 
Disseminators of oral 
information. 
Data for information 
operations (crimes by 
the Soviet authorities, 
people’s attitudes, anti-
Soviet activities of foreign 
countries). 
Information to identify 
targets (physical 
parameters, justification 
for the selection of target).
Resources for carrying out 
armed activities 
Contacts with Western 
countries.
Feasibility: The 
dissemination of written 
information requires 
printing facilities.
Feasibility: The availability 
of resources for attacking 
the Soviets and arming the 
population.
Feasibility: Lack of 







to prepare for and 
conduct the war.
Gathering information (the 
political and economic situation 
in the Estonian SSR, people’s 
attitudes, location/nature of the 
Soviet security agencies and 
armed units).
Relaying the information to 
foreign countries.
Local inhabitants.
Collaborators with the 
Soviet authorities (by 
making them double 
agents)
Forest Brothers capable 
of gathering intelligence 
(skills, discipline, 
connections, ability to 
move around).
Communication channels 
(radio stations, postal 
service, courier, state 
media).
Feasibility: Persuading 




resources, a strong 
ideological stance).
Feasibility: Establishing a 
system of communication 
(channels, methods, 
willingness of both parties).
Table 1. The JORSS Strategy:  Ends, Ways, and Means (cont.)
V. Oras claimed that the group 
only went so far as to make 
preparations for establishing a 
Forest Brothers’ organization 
once a war was underway.
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Estonia was divided into three parts. Two of the parts were reportedly man-
aged by a major and a captain, and the third part by Richard Saaliste. The 
structure itself was planned and generally created as follows.    
Structure of the “organization” (see Figure 1):
 ¡ Government-in-exile (primarily in Sweden at this time): managed the 
three staffs (henceforward, 1/3 staffs), each of which oversaw one third 
of Estonian territory, through directions for long-term action. Further 
instructions were relayed through proxies, by mail, via broadcast radio 
in coded messages,20 or by direct radio communications. 
 ¡ 1/3 staff: managed the staff branches. To a lesser extent, each staff, con-
sisting of three to five individuals, also coordinated its activity with the 
other two 1/3 staffs.21 Contact with the staff branches was maintained 
above all to initiate coordinated fighting and to give specific orders 
during combat. The instruction these staffs provided in anticipation 
of coming war was aimed at the survival of the personnel in a hostile 
environment and to further their political education. 
 ¡ Staff branch: maintained constant contact with the 1/3 staff, groups 
of Forest Brothers, and individuals hiding in their region. The staff 
branches also were usually three to five people, depending on who was 
available and the territory and population to be coordinated. Again, 
most of the instructions they disseminated were to support the survival 
of personnel in a wartime environment and to provide political educa-
tion with leaflets and brochures. If necessary, cooperation would be 
coordinated before the war. In addition, this group received informa-
tion from other Forest Brothers and supporters by means of personal 
interviews. The instructions from the staff branch were designed to 
support survival and reduce conflicting activities among the different 
groups of Forest Brothers. Intelligence-related tasks were normally not 
given to groups or individuals but were performed by members of the 
staff branch.
 ¡ Groups of Forest Brothers/individual members: made their own 
plans for hiding and operating. They carried out no specific orders or 
tasks coming from the staff branches. Contact with supporters and 
informants reinforced the activity or security of the group and was not 
usually intended to fulfill the needs or tasks of the staff branch.
Sympathizers
Supporters of the resistance included farms or individuals who helped sus-
tain the Forest Brothers with material goods or resources, accommodation, 
medical aid, or transportation, depending on their situation. Their support 
was organized in an ad hoc fashion, based on their specific capabilities and 
ideological attitude. A supporter could not go directly to the Forest Brothers 
but had instead to arrange a meeting with an individual. Meetings could also 
be set up through intermediaries or a “mailbox” (drop box) arrangement. 
Information was communicated through personal meetings. In the event of 
a particular danger, preset signals were used to spread the word. The Forest 
Brothers made use of informants who were in the service of Soviet authorities, 
mostly to gather security-related information and relay it at agreed meet-
ings. Communication of crucial information might also take place through 
a mailbox or via an intermediary. It is important to note that many of the 
Forest Brothers made their 
own plans for hiding and 
operating. They carried out 
no specific orders or tasks 
coming from the staffs.
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farms run by sympathizers relied on Forest Brothers to work in exchange for 
food. These farmers then shared in the loot when the Forest Brothers attacked 
Soviet-run collective farms and cooperatives. This largesse served as a sort of 
deposit that encouraged further support in later months. The entire structure 
was designed essentially to serve the strategic goal of maintaining armed 
strength. In other words, the structure itself did not support operations, but 
rather the communication of information.
 Many of the farms run 
by sympathizers relied on 
Forest Brothers to work 
in exchange for food.
There were no joint funds 
above the group level—each 
band had to support itself.
There was no specialization throughout the different management levels of 
JORSS. For instance, intelligence work was performed according to the abili-
ties of specific individuals. The means and opportunities of each group were 
determined for that particular group alone. At the same time, each group was 
prepared to support other groups if security was at stake, because any breach 
of security threatened the entire resistance movement. The size of the group 
depended on the experience of the individual Forest Brothers and the task 
environment (support and risk). There were no joint funds above the group 
level—each band had to support itself. All documented structures and lists 
were forbidden. Information on the location and number of Forest Brothers 
maintained by the 1/3 staff, however, would enable leaders to quickly restruc-
ture a fighting force in the event of war. 
The decentralized organization characteristic of the resistance in the Baltic 
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Figure 1: The Structure of JORSS
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to them, the lack of common leadership 
was compensated for by strong discipline on 
the local level, sustained by the social status 
of being a Forest Brother and the enforced 
discipline of hiding and undertaking covert 
actions over the course of several years while 
surrounded by the enemy.22 In today’s terms, 
such an organizational structure and system of 
subordination can be compared to al Qaeda, 
which also lacks a conventional hierarchical 
chain of command.23
Information from the archives of the MGB 
indicates that the various Forest Brothers’ 
groups were aware of each other’s existence and 
had the opportunity to contact one another in 
accordance with the objectives and methods of 
the JORSS strategy. It is nevertheless difficult to determine the size, location, 
and members of the groups precisely, because these kept changing. The thesis 
from which this article was drawn contains a basic list of the Forest Brothers 
who were in contact with the branch staff either in person or through 
proxies.24 The list includes a total of more than 130 people in hiding between 
1947 and 1949 who were known to branch staff and could have been mobi-
lized for concentrated action at short notice.25 There were men and women 
of various backgrounds among them, although the women would likely have 
played only a supporting role in combat.
To sum up the question of communicating with Forest Brothers’ groups and 
uniting individual resistance fighters, it can be said that more than 100 people 
were at least in contact with JORSS in 1949. The territory in which they were 
most active was situated about 50 km from the Estonian capital of Tallinn, 
and covered an area approximately 60 km square of rural and forested land. 
There are many examples of Forest Brothers’ activities far away from this 
“main territory,” but it should be noted that the whole of Estonia is only 
about 350 km square.
The Results of the Study
The thesis analyzed the Forest Brothers and the JORSS strategy on the basis 
of the five theoretical requirements for a resistance movement (the Bender-
Johnson method described in the introduction). This section discusses the 
results of that study, and what it revealed about the strengths and weaknesses 
of the strategy. 
Requirement No. 1: The structure and strategy of a resistance 
movement must match the environment. 
The JORSS strategy was based on an understanding of the prevailing circumstances 
and the power of the Soviet authorities; hence, it focused on overthrowing 
Soviet rule only in the event of an outbreak of international war. The tactics 
were instead based on limiting attacks (usually only on collaborators), so as to 
maintain a minimal presence in the “market” of Estonian society, and the re-
plenishment of supplies (through attacks on state enterprises and institutions). 
The lack of common leadership 
was compensated for by strong 
discipline on the local level.
The JORSS strategy was based 
on an awareness of enemy 
tactics and therefore avoided 
frequent small-scale actions.
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The concern was that a more aggressive strategy would only invite a show of 
force by the Soviets, as occurred in Lithuania in 1947, when brutal attacks 
by resistance fighters were met with an additional 70,000 troops brought in 
from Russia. This strategy of minimal violence was adopted by most Forest 
Brothers.
The JORSS strategy, as well as the Forest Brothers’ operations, was based on an 
awareness of enemy tactics and therefore avoided frequent small-scale  
actions; the movement thus prevented the Soviets from differentiating be-
tween the various regions and groups. This hindered the ability of the enemy 
to accurately analyze the Forest Brothers, and thus their ability to concentrate 
countermeasures in specific regions.
The JORSS leaders and, to an extent, the Forest Brothers realized the difficult 
economic situation of their principal support base—the Estonian population. 
At the end of the 1940s, the Soviet Union, anticipating another war, increased 
taxes and appropriated such a large percentage of agricultural output that 
many Estonians suffered from hunger. At the same time, Moscow severely de-
valued the currency through “reforms.” This difficult economic situation was 
also taken into consideration, for the most part, by the Forest Brothers when 
planning their activities. At the same time, JORSS staff exercised no higher-
level control in that area nor did they give any instructions of a more specific 
nature. The weakness of the strategy sometimes manifested when Forest 
Brothers engaged in the public robbery of private property. The resulting 
Soviet propaganda and economic controls had a negative impact on the 
market of sympathizers for the Forest Brothers and lost them support. This in 
turn enabled the Soviet authorities to develop their intelligence network more 
effectively.
The strategy as well as the activity of the Forest Brothers showed that working 
for the people who were sympathetic to them was an important way for 
the resistance fighters to create a material support base for themselves. The 
replenishment of supplies through labor was one of the strongest aspects of 
the strategy and the Forest Brothers’ operations. It not only enhanced their 
base of support but also helped them avoid conflicts with the Soviet authori-
ties, and prevented further deterioration of conditions for the local population 
(as simple confiscation would have caused).
It must be noted here that the majority of the Forest Brothers studied in the 
course of this research were arrested and/or killed as a result of intelligence 
work by Soviet security agents. The available sources suggest, however, that 
all of those who collaborated with the security agencies were recruited from 
among legal citizens or those whom the authorities had legalized, with the 
help of compromising circumstances (e.g., they had served in the German 
army or the Home Guard, or had recently left the resistance), and that none 
of them was a current member of the Forest Brothers.
Requirement No. 2: The organization must possess a market and 
demonstrate its presence in the market. 
The dissemination of information, as a means to maintain presence in the 
market of public opinion, should be regarded as a strength of the strategy. 
This requirement, however, was only partially fulfilled by the Forest Brothers, 
The weakness of the strategy 
sometimes manifested when 
Forest Brothers engaged 
in the public robbery 
of private property.
The replenishment of supplies 
through labor was one of 
the strongest aspects of 
the strategy and the Forest 
Brothers’ operations.
The dissemination of 
information, as a means to 
maintain presence in the 
market of public opinion, 
should be regarded as a 
strength of the strategy.
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primarily with leaflets and other forms of propaganda. The fact that the 
groups did not spread information about their operational successes, such as 
attacking Communist activists and collective farms, was a weak spot of the 
strategy, and lost them the opportunity to gain wider support. It also allowed 
the Soviet authorities to spread uncontested misinformation about supposed 
atrocities committed by the Forest Brothers. The restrictions the Soviet 
authorities put on the dissemination of information (e.g., access to printing 
facilities), along with the constant barrage of Soviet propaganda, in fairness, 
made it difficult for the Forest Brothers to meet their information objectives. 
Meanwhile, the Soviet authorities were busy taking over the opinion market 
by other means as well, such as managing the safety and welfare of the popula-
tion. Hence, even if the Forest Brothers had been better at disseminating 
anti-Soviet information among Estonia’s inhabitants, they would not have 
prevented the Soviet authorities from monopolizing the market. 
The maintenance of market share in the form of relaying international 
information and raising political awareness was also a strength of the strategy. 
These tactics were put into practice, but again there was a shortcoming in the 
organizational structure. The number of individuals doing the work was too 
small, and they all had concurrent duties, which made it impossible for them 
to work to the best of their abilities in any one area of responsibility.
Requirement No. 3: The structure of a resistance movement should 
be closed.
In principle, the organizational structure of the Forest Brothers matched the 
environmental circumstances and the goals of the strategy. It was a closed 
organization that made the inclusion of new members quite difficult, and 
the connections among the groups were not susceptible to the counter-
activities of the security agencies. This is supported by several examples 
where the attempted elimination of a group as a whole was unsuccessful, or 
an attack on one group did not lead the security agents to other groups. In 
other words, there was no “domino effect” among the rest of the units when 
Forest Brothers were captured. Nevertheless, there were some significant 
exceptions. For instance, the elimination of Richard Saaliste and his group 
became possible through the connections of one person whom the authorities 
had arrested. At the same time, however, other groups were not threatened 
by the arrest of their members. Because, as a matter of policy, there were 
no clear terms of subordination or member lists to be discovered, security 
service investigation records reveal that the security agencies never grasped the 
structure of the organization, and this hindered them in planning operations. 
This closed organizational structure thus can be considered a strength of the 
resistance’s strategy and activities.
When a closed organization is operating in a hostile environment, limiting 
the information that is available to any individual is of critical importance. 
Adherence to this rule would have rendered agency work ineffective, but the 
activity of the Forest Brothers reveals numerous examples where this rule was 
broadly disregarded. One good example is the case of a legal civilian, a former 
Estonian officer, who was believed to be a Forest Brother but was actually a 
Soviet agent. Other Forest Brothers passed information to him that he did not 
need to know. This breach of discipline enabled the security agencies to largely 
eliminate three groups of Forest Brothers, including the leader of a 1/3 staff. 
It should be stressed here that this episode constituted a remarkable violation 
The Soviet authorities were 
busy taking over the opinion 
market by managing the safety 
and welfare of the population.
Security service investigation 
records reveal that the security 
agencies never grasped 
the structure of the Forest 
Brothers’ organization.
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of the strategy. At the same time, the organization proved unable to respond 
to such violations and introduce changes to its activities that would prevent 
another incident.
Forest Brothers were directed to not trust anyone who had changed their 
ideological view and gave support to the Communists; all contact was to stop 
immediately. This guidance, however, mistook the real threat. As described 
earlier, recruited agents cooperated with the regime not because of ideological 
principles but most often because their background with the German armed 
forces or the Home Guard, or with the Forest Brothers themselves, left them 
and their families vulnerable to threats of deportation. This blind spot meant 
that the strategy focused on ideological differences to evaluate threats, while the 
Forest Brothers’ actual betrayers were not in fact different from themselves. 
It is very difficult, if not impossible, to say how much this instruction was fol-
lowed during resistance activities and whether doing so resulted in any actual 
harm to the Forest Brothers. Such an instruction most likely demonstrates the 
general views of the Forest Brothers—that is, threats were judged on the basis 
of ideological stances. Adherence to this directive, combined with violations of 
the rules of confidentiality, however, had potentially catastrophic consequences 
for the organization. Taking into account the general environment of Estonia 
at the time, this instruction can be regarded as a deficiency of the strategy.
Despite the instruction given in the strategy that units should operate in an 
unfamiliar area, this was rarely followed by the Forest Brothers. Most of them 
were based in their native region, which ensured a better base of material sup-
port, access to information, and familiarity with the area of operations. They 
also enjoyed freedom of movement and a very good overview of the security 
agencies operating in the area. Although the reasoning behind the strategy’s 
directive is not unsound, the fact that the Forest Brothers largely chose to do 
the opposite should be seen as a strength.
The requirement to limit the information given to supporters is in large part 
the same as the rule concerning interactions with legal citizens. Excessive 
knowledge in the possession of supporters who were arrested served as the 
basis for successful MGB intelligence work. The Forest Brothers’ activities in 
that area must be regarded as a violation of the strategy.
There are several examples proving that the speed of communications between 
organizational levels was at least satisfactory. It would likely have served its 
purpose in the event of war. In addition, the communication network fulfilled 
security requirements, and, as a result, there is no evidence that it had a nega-
tive effect on the activity of the organization. Hence, communication can be 
regarded as a strength of the strategy and activities. 
Requirement No. 4: The success of the organization lies in 
increasing its numbers and fighting. 
From the creation of the JORSS organization in 1947 to its eradication in 1949, 
it maintained contacts with the Estonian resistance according to strategy, 
so that concentrated armed action could have been organized in case of 
the outbreak of war. Hence, this aspect must be deemed a strength of the 
organization. 
The factor that put an end to the growth of the resistance movement was the 
success of the security forces in infiltrating the organization and recruiting 
The strategy focused on 
ideological differences, while 
the Forest Brothers’ actual 
betrayers were not in fact 
different from themselves.
Most Forest Brothers were 
based in their native region, 
which ensured a better 
base of material support, 
access to information, and 
familiarity with the area.
 The speed of communications 
between organizational levels 
would likely have served its 
purpose in the event of war.
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collaborators, which led to subsequent successful attacks against the Forest 
Brothers. Hence, while the need to raise additional support that came with 
an increase in group numbers and agent infiltration were not the only reasons 
behind the dissolution of the organization, they both played a part in it. The 
failure of the Forest Brothers in the fight against the Soviet security agencies 
started with the strategy, which touched on the area of recruitment only 
briefly. Based on the activity of the Forest Brothers, it can be said that they 
were successful with regard to the growth of the organization and operational 
planning, while their weakness lay primarily in poor countermeasures against 
the work of the security agencies. This weakness manifested mainly in viola-
tions of the rules of confidentiality. Accordingly, the tendency for the weak-
nesses of the strategy to be compounded in practice should be regarded as the 
reason for the movement’s failure.
Requirement No. 5: Success depends on short-term as well as long-
term organizational decisions.
The maintenance of resistance forces as a long-term decision is a strength of 
the strategy; however, this was not supported by the short-term activities of 
the Forest Brothers. Group leaders should have made immediate decisions, 
for example, to enforce confidentiality or limit attacks against the Soviets, in 
order to improve the groups’ ability to remain in hiding. Opportunities to 
make such decisions or changes came: 1) after the arrest of Oras in March 
1949—the loss of a significant political and operational leader; 2) after the 
March 1949 deportation of approximately 30,000 people suspected to have 
connections with the Forest Brothers—a change in the general environment, 
which heightened fear and insecurity; and 3) after the elimination of the 
Forest Brothers in the second half of 1949—the success of enemy tactics and 
agent networks.26 Despite knowing that the secret police were successfully 
recruiting among their support base, the Forest Brothers failed to adjust their 
communications strategies or reevaluate their relations with supporters.
Contacts with individuals working in different Soviet power structures 
ensured that the resistance movement had access to the data it required for 
general intelligence-related activities as well as the information needed for 
personal security. There are several examples in the archives of the resistance’s 
contacts with such people and the information the Forest Brothers received 
from them. Furthermore, the Forest Brothers’ awareness of the security agen-
cies’ ongoing activities points to the fact that they had sources in the agencies 
and elsewhere in the Soviet power structures. Despite the eventual dissolution 
of the organization, their intelligence activity within the Soviet power struc-
tures can be regarded as a strength of the activity.
Summary
The primary objective of the JORSS strategy—survival of the Forest Brothers 
as an armed force for the purpose of war between the Western countries and 
the Soviet Union—based on an understanding of the resistance’s capabilities, 
can be considered a strength of the strategy. The strategy thus identified three 
desired outcomes. Achieving them would have made it possible to support the 
overthrow of Soviet rule in the Estonian SSR in the event of a larger war.27
The first outcome required to accomplish the strategic objective of organi-
zational survival was to avoid direct contact with the security agencies and 
other armed structures. This excluded any attack on the Soviet armed forces or 
The tendency for the 
weaknesses of the strategy to be 
compounded in practice should 
be regarded as the reason 
for the movement’s failure.
The Forest Brothers’ awareness 
of the security agencies’ 
ongoing activities points to the 
fact that they had sources in 
the agencies and elsewhere.
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their bases. Armed actions were mostly aimed at replenishing the supply base. 
Attacks against collaborators or leaders at the local government level were not 
regulated, but they were avoided by and large as well. 
Both spying on the security agencies to increase personal safety and adherence 
to rules of confidentiality certainly played an important part in the strategy, 
but these were not regulated in the strategy in detail. In order to mobilize the 
armed forces of the Forest Brothers in the event of war, the JORSS leadership, 
specifically the staff branches, had to make contact with different groups and 
individuals, and establish constant communication. For them to undertake 
concentrated armed warfare, military support from the Western countries was 
deemed crucial.
The second outcome set for the JORSS organization was to convince the 
population to join in the effort to overthrow Soviet rule, as well as hinder the 
Soviets’ mobilization within the Estonian SSR in the event of a war. To attain 
that outcome, the strategy emphasized spreading political propaganda among 
the inhabitants, including the dissemination of international anti-Soviet news. 
Gathering information on the attitudes of the population likely served the 
same purpose.
The third outcome was to gather information on the situation in the Estonian 
SSR with regard to population, economy, armed units, and public order 
and relay it to the Estonian expatriates to help the Western 
countries prepare for war. 
From 1947 on, the Forest Brothers largely performed the 
tasks set in the JORSS strategy. The research for this study 
has uncovered some facts that suggest that the scope of the 
organization, both geographically and with regard to the 
number of individuals and groups, was probably much greater 
than the 130 people identified in the thesis. Groups had stable 
contacts that would have made it possible to bring them 
together at short notice to support the military action of the 
Western countries. The author estimates that the high point 
of operational alertness was from summer 1948 to autumn 
1949. Despite the enemy’s superiority with regard to weapons 
and personnel, the Forest Brothers operated effectively during 
that period, both in staying hidden and in their attacks on 
state enterprises, institutions, and Soviet activists. 
The Forest Brothers’ success was aided by years of experience, 
familiarity with the local environment and remarkably good 
connections in the security agencies, which made it possible 
to avoid anti-resistance operations. The connections are illus-
trated by their awareness of enemy activities as well as relative 
freedom to move over distances of dozens of kilometers—
during daytime, on roads, and by public transportation. The 
large relative importance of working for local residents as a way 
to replenish their supplies and win support is also remarkable. 
In that period of just over a year, the Forest Brothers were also 
active in disseminating political information. They compiled 
informative written materials in a deliberate and coordinated 
To undertake concentrated 
armed warfare, military 
support from the Western 
countries was deemed crucial.
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manner, from foreign media channels and personal observations made in 
Estonia. The author estimates that the level of activity in the field of strategic 
intelligence, where the data requested by Saaliste was being gathered, was just 
as high. Given the objective of the strategy—to win over the population—
these areas in particular should be highlighted in a positive sense, because the 
preparations were meant for war, not for the immediate overthrow of Soviet 
rule. Such activity was much better suited to the strategic goals and opportu-
nities provided by the environment than direct armed conflicts with the Soviet 
authorities.
Strategic weaknesses, however, developed into catastrophic flaws in practice. 
As the security agencies realized the ineffectiveness of their counter-resistance 
strategy, despite having much greater numbers of personnel, the MGB began 
to focus increasingly on intelligence work. The experience its agents had 
gained in earlier years and from other regions of the Soviet Union certainly 
helped. In the author’s opinion, the environment of the Estonian SSR was 
extremely fruitful for counter-resistance activities in 1949. The continually 
changing social order, the deteriorating economic situation, and the lack of 
personal security turned people’s attention away from the ideology of national 
independence and toward personal survival. Individuals who had served in 
the German army or Home Guard, or who had once been Forest Brothers, 
were excellent targets for agency recruitment due to their compromising past 
and the ensuing fear of persecution. Such individuals, of course, most likely 
still harbored anti-Soviet views and were not a particular threat to the Forest 
Brothers. Nevertheless, the road to success for the secret police was paved by 
the aforementioned lack of specificity in the JORSS strategy, the organization’s 
unresponsive leadership, and repeated violations of confidentiality in practice. 
The systematic, patient, and ruthless activity of the Soviet security agen-
cies—still despised in Estonia to this day—eradicated practically the entire 
resistance organization between autumn 1949 and spring 1950. Although some 
experienced leaders of the Forest Brothers survived, the steady losses meant yet 
more shattered hopes for the so-called rank-and-file members and supporters, 
and they began to focus more of their attention on personal welfare than on 
resistance.
The reasons behind the defeat of the Forest Brothers’ movement, as this article 
shows, are different from the assumptions commonly held by historians today. 
The movement’s failure was not directly caused by the loss of people’s support, 
the March deportation of 1949 and the resulting increase in the number of 
those in hiding, nor the superiority of the security agencies with regard to 
personnel and weaponry. The main reason was that the group violated the 
rules of confidentiality to a remarkable extent, which gave the security forces 
excellent opportunities to plan exact strikes. Or to put it even more simply:  
the reason behind the eradication of the Forest Brothers lies in the betrayals 
committed by those who found themselves betrayed.  
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Cutting the Link between Illegal Drugs and Terrorists
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The nexus between some terrorist organizations and the illegal drug trade has 
broadened since the end of the Cold War.1 According to a recent study, “The 
illegal drug trade is estimated to turn over more than $330 billion annually,”2 
and terrorist organizations have actively participated in this trade.3 In order 
to combat terrorist activities effectively, counterterrorism forces and agencies 
should address the question of funding, of which drug trafficking is a main 
source. Drug traffickers around the world require assistance from groups that 
have military skills, weapons, access to clandestine networks, and safe havens. 
While “opiates and cocaine remain the most problematic drugs across the 
globe,”4 this article looks at only opiates, as they are the most profitable and 
lethal illicit drugs.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2012 World Drug 
Report states that Afghanistan generates 63% of the world’s poppy crop.5 
Of the 75–80 metric tons of heroin trafficked to Europe in 2009, 60 metric 
tons were transferred along a route through the Balkans with the direct 
involvment of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a militant Kurdish 
separatist group active primarily in Turkey and Iraq), which has emerged as 
a major drug trafficker.6 This article spotlights the opium–heroin trafficking 
link between the primary terrorist organization operating in Afghanistan, the 
Taliban, and the group reaping the highest benefit from the heroin trade in 
Europe, the PKK.7
During our research, we found a gap in the data concerning the exact value 
of money being generated by these terrorist organizations through the drug 
trade. In addition, none of the studies we looked at tried to identify vulner-
able links in the drug trafficking chain, the targeting of which might cut 
one of the terrorist organizations’ primary revenue streams. With these two 
analytical gaps guiding us, we first identified five stages in the illicit drug 
trafficking process: cultivation, processing, shipment, sale, and consumption. 
The study then calculates the extent of the Taliban’s and the PKK’s involve-
ment in each of these five stages. This research creates a counter-narcoterrorist 
model that displays weak and vulnerable links in the narcotics supply chain, 
which we use to propose countermeasures and present ways to reduce the 
funding these terrorist groups are gaining through illicit drug trafficking. 
The Opium Nexus Between the Taliban and the PKK
Determining how much the Taliban benefit from the drug trade each year 
is a matter of great debate, and estimates range from $30–200 million (all 
figures are given in U.S. dollars).8 Since the Taliban do not keep records in 
either handwritten or digital form, it is unlikely that their drug earnings can 
be calculated with complete accuracy. Nevertheless, the 2009 UNODC report, 
“Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan 
Opium,” estimated that a decade ago the Taliban earned $75–100 million 
 None of the studies we looked 
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per year by taxing opium poppy cultivation; 
however, since 2005, the Taliban have earned 
$90–160 million per year from the taxes they col-
lect on opium production and trade.9 According 
to our calculation, the Taliban earn approximately 
$530–570 million annually from the cultivation, 
processing, and shipment of opium and heroin. 
The breakdown of this money stream is illustrated 
in Figure 1.
After leaving Afghanistan, opium travels to different parts of the world. 
Although the highest demand is in Asia, the greatest profit is generated in the 
European market. The main route from Afghanistan to Europe is via Iran and 
Turkey to the Balkan region. It is along this route that the PKK run the most 
active smuggling operation and where they gain 
the highest profit. There are numerous estimates 
of the PKK’s revenue derived from the illegal drug 
trade, varying from $50 million to $2.5 billion.10 
According to our calculation, using figures from 
the 2010 UNODC report, “The Globalization of 
Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat 
Assessment,” the PKK generates approximately 
$600–700 million annually from the heroin trade. 
Figure 2 depicts the breakdown of this revenue stream. 
Cultivation 
Heroin is produced from the sap of the opium poppy, a flowering plant that 
blossoms in warm, dry climates. The plant requires a growing period of six to 
seven months and is generally cultivated in the ungoverned zones of countries 
with a weak central government. The main reason farmers engage in opium 
cultivation despite its illegality is the incomparable profits involved in this 
business.11 The most suitable places for its cultivation are Afghanistan and the 
so-called Golden Triangle, the mountainous region shared by Myanmar, Thai-
land, Laos, and Vietnam.12 According to the 2012 UNODC report, Afghanistan 
remains the main country for opium poppy cultivation, and accounts for two 
thirds of the global opium crop.13
Recent UNODC statistics have shown that between 2008 and 2012, opium 
cultivation increased in the Taliban-controlled regions of Afghanistan. The 
Taliban provide protection and support to Afghan farmers to cultivate their 
poppy crops and then tax the yield. Gretchen Peters stated that the Taliban 
collect a 10% tax or tithe (called ushr in Arabic) from the poppy farmers in 
their area of control, and this percentage of taxation is applicable at the farm 
level.14 In addition to the profit the Taliban make by taxing farmers, they 
apparently also have started growing poppy on their own, despite professed 
religious scruples. This poppy cultivation is done covertly by the Taliban, and 
they avoid portraying themselves as opium farmers. (While the Taliban clearly 
play an active role in opium production, this study did not find any evidence 
that the PKK participate in the opium cultivation phase.) The UNODC esti-
mated that the Afghan opium yield in 2011 was 5,800 metric tons, of which 
98% came from Taliban-controlled regions. The 2011 average farm-gate price 
of raw opium was $250 per kg in Afghanistan.15 This means that the Taliban 
netted approximately $142 million from the 2011 opium crop alone. The 
Although the highest demand  
for opium is in Asia, the 
greatest profit is generated 
in the European market.
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Figure 2: Breakdown of the PKK’s Annual Opium Revenue
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equation for calculating the Taliban’s revenue from opium cultivation is shown 
as follows. 
Processing 
The cumbersome process of turning raw opium tar into pure heroin consists 
of nine stages: extracting morphine from the raw opium; separating the 
morphine solution from the water-insoluble opium components; treatment of 
the water-insoluble opium constituents; precipitation, isolation, and drying 
of the morphine; conversion of the morphine into heroin base; precipitation 
and isolation of the brown heroin base; purification of the brown heroin base; 
precipitation and isolation of the white heroin base; and conversion of the 
heroin base to heroin hydrochloride, the drug sold on the street.16
The Taliban also tax drug processors according to the amount of refined end 
product they produce. There are different types of opium products, such as 
raw opium, morphine base, and refined heroin, and the level of taxation varies 
for the different products. In 2011, total heroin production in Afghanistan 
was estimated at around 467 metric tons.17 According to Gretchen Peters, the 
Taliban control more than 50 laboratories within Afghanistan, and levy a tax 
of $250 for every kilogram of refined heroin that comes out (morphine base is 
taxed at a slightly lesser rate).18 Thus, in 2011 the Taliban collected approxi-
mately $116 million from the refining process. The equation for calculating 
the Taliban’s revenue in heroin production is depicted as follows.
The PKK also directly or indirectly involve themselves in opium processing 
operations. They either own or tax the drug laboratories situated in regions 
under their control. The U.S. Treasury Department has evidence that the PKK 
process morphine base they receive from Afghanistan into heroin at labora-
tories situated in Turkey, and that they then sell their product to distributors 
throughout Europe.19 Table 1 depicts the UNODC data on opium products from 
Afghanistan.
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Table 1: Potential Illicit Production of Opium and Manufacture 
of Heroin in Tons of Unknown Purity, 2004–2011
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total potential opium 
production
4850 4620 6610 8890 8641 7853 4736 6995
Potential opium not processed 
into heroin
1197 1169 2056 3411 3080 2898 1728 3400
Potential opium processed 
into heroin
3653 3451 4555 5479 5561 4955 3008 3595
Total potential heroin 
manufacture
529 472 629 757 752 667 384 467
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According to our calculation, the PKK generate approximately $25 million 
annually from heroin processing. The equation for calculating this revenue is 
depicted as follows. 
Shipment
Shipment refers to the movement of heroin from the laboratory where the 
opium was processed to the point of sale. There are three main routes for 
moving opium out of Afghanistan to where it will be processed into heroin, 
and the Taliban either control these routes or provide protection and diversion 
tactics to ensure safe movement of the opium. This stage is the node within 
the drug trafficking process whereby the Taliban generate the highest revenue, 
which, according to our calculations, comes to approximately $300 million 
annually. The equation for calculating the Taliban’s revenue from heroin ship-
ment is depicted as follows.  
According to Sedat Laciner, the PKK have taken advantage of their good luck 
at being located along the drug smuggling route of the “Golden Crescent,” 
between the opium-producing East and the heroin-consuming West.21 
Benjamin Freedman and Matthew Levitt noted that the PKK get their highest 
profit by taxing the drug smugglers in regions under their control, and this 
taxation serves as a crucial income source for the group.22 According to our 
calculations, the PKK generate approximately $325 million annually from 
the shipping of heroin, in addition to wholesale revenue.23 The numbers in 
the calculation of heroin shipment revenue shown below are for Norway, a 
country we chose at random to represent all European countries. However, 
we use a similar procedure for calculating the PKK’s revenue generated from 
the rest of the European countries. In our calculation, the wholesale revenue 
is added to the shipment revenue because the heroin has not yet reached the 
consumers.
The shipping stage is the node 
within the drug trafficking 
process whereby the Taliban 
generate the highest revenue.
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Sales are the middle node between shippers and consumers, and involve both 
the wholesale and retail drug markets. The Taliban actively involve them-
selves by either taxing drug traders or directly engaging in the growing and 
processing of opium; however, they always tend to separate themselves from 
selling these illicit drugs. According to Peters’ survey, local people acknowl-
edge the Taliban’s role in the drug trade; however, they categorically deny the 
Taliban’s direct involvement in the sale of heroin.25 Therefore, this research 
does not find that the Taliban gained any revenue from the sale of heroin.
The PKK are actively involved in heroin sales across Europe, utilizing the 
Kurdish diaspora to control the street-level sales of illegal drugs in the Euro-
pean market.26 They also tax other drug sellers, and generally control nearly 
all of the European heroin market. Even Kurdish children 10 to 15 years 
old are involved in selling drugs in many European cities.27 Similarly, the 
heavy PKK involvement in the drug trade is evidenced by the number of PKK 
members who are arrested for criminal activity in various European cities and 
in Turkey.28 According to our calculations, the PKK earn approximately $300 
million annually from street sales of heroin.29 The figures we use to calculate 
sales revenue in the equation below are again for Norway only, although we 
use a procedure similar to the previous equation to calculate the PKK’s revenue 
generated from the rest of the European countries.
The PKK utilize the Kurdish 
diaspora to control the street-
level sales of illegal drugs 
and control nearly all the 
European heroin market.
Even Kurdish children 10 to 15 
years old are involved in selling 
drugs in many European cities.
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Total heroin (kg) trafficked on the Balkan Route  
Est. PKK’s traffic share at the Turkish border 
Taxation rate 
Percentage value of heroin smuggled by the PKK 
$/1 kg of heroin in the Afghan wholesale market 
Taxation revenue from shipping
PLUS
Kg of heroin entering a European country (figure for 
 Norway) 
Prevalence ratios of users in Norway 
Population of Norway aged 15–6424
(Total population of Kurdish diaspora in Norway)
Est. market share of the PKK 
(If diaspora ratio < 0.005, est. wholesale share for PKK 
 (1-retail share for PKK)     
Wholesale price of heroin for Norway ($/kg) 
Wholesale revenue 
 80,000 
×  0.8 
×  0.1 
× 0.2
×  2400




×  0.0003 
×  2,195,734
× (3,182,224/12,447)    




= $  6,798,566
Amount of heroin (kgs) reaching Europe (figures for 
 Norway) 
Prevalence ratios of users for Norway 
Population of Norway aged 15–64 
(Total population of Kurdish diaspora in Norway) 
Est. percentage of market control for PKK 
If diaspora ratio ≥ 0.005, then PKK est. retail share,  
 otherwise,“0”  
Retail price of heroin in Europe x 1000 (tons into kgs)  
Street level sales revenue
 1000 
 
×  0.0003 
×  2,195,734 
×  (3,182,224/12,447) 
×  0.0073 
 
×  0 .0021 
×      45    ×  1000
=        $  11,617, 802
Consumption
Consumption is the last step in the illegal drug trafficking process and com-
pletes the supply-and-demand chain. A United Nations estimate of annual 
opiate consumption from 1998 to 2008 reveals a global increase of 34.5%, 
from 12.9 million people in 1998 to 17.35 million people in 2008.30 According 
to the 2012 UNODC report, there are approximately 21 million opiate users 
worldwide, suggesting an increase of 21% in consumers from 2008 to 2012.31 
The main reason for such an increase in consumption is the decreasing prices 
of these illicit drugs.32
If members of the Taliban consumed heroin, it could be a financial drain on 
their organization. However, according to the Taliban ideology and their ver-
sion of Islam, the consumption of any opiate is prohibited, while the produc-
tion and trade of opium to non-Muslims are allowed.33
The PKK encourage people to consume illicit drugs because of the enormous 
revenue generated; selling heroin to drug addicts helps fulfill the organization’s 
political objectives. According to Hasim Soylemez, two drug dealers confessed 
that the PKK give drugs to young people in the east and southeast parts of 
Turkey as a reward for participating in pro-PKK demonstrations. In the Hak-
kari district, the average age of drug consumers is 14 years old, and an esti-
mated 45% of the children around this age are addicted to illegal substances.34 
Over the long run, it seems likely that the PKK would suffer a significant cost 
from this behavior, if nearly half of the population of potential new recruits to 
their organization are heroin addicts.
Counter-Narcoterrorism Solution Model
The process of narcotics trafficking diverges or converges at each stage of the 
production-trafficking chain. Figure 3 displays the counter-narcoterrorism 
model from opium cultivation to street-level sale. What it makes clear is that 
the opium from widespread poppy fields converges at a few countable and 
targetable morphine/heroin processing labs. The opium products then follow 
an increasingly divergent path from the processing to the marketing stage. 
This path also splits into smaller sub-nodes as it moves from smuggler to 
distributor to street pusher to user, which make effective interdiction very dif-
ficult. It is important to note that the heroin processing stage is the only stage 
in the chain where the paths of raw material, processor, and smuggler con-
verge into a relatively few targetable facilities. Therefore, this model proposes 
that the processing stage should be targeted for interdiction.
In the Hakkari district, an 
estimated 45% of children 
around 14 years old are 
addicted to illegal substances.
 The heroin processing stage is 
the only stage where the paths 
of raw material, processor, 
and smuggler converge into a 
relatively few targetable facilities.
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Although the processing stage only 
accounts for approximately one fifth 
of the total opium revenue appropri-
ated by the Taliban, disrupting it 
can cut the Taliban’s resource stream 
through the rest of the drug traf-
ficking chain. If less heroin were 
available from Afghanistan, the PKK’s 
funding stream would be substantially 
reduced as well. The PKK are com-
paratively less vulnerable in the pro-
cessing stage of the drug trafficking 
chain, however, because they tax or 
run only a few heroin processing labs. 
Nevertheless, this model suggests that 
any increase in the PKK’s involvement 
in the heroin processing stage would 
make them relatively more vulnerable 
to counterterrorism efforts.
Recommendations
The countermeasures that will affect these two terrorist organizations the 
most involve reducing their drug money. This article demonstrates that both 
the Taliban and the PKK gain huge amounts of money from the heroin 
trade. Therefore, there is a strong need to combat the illegal opium trade as 
a counterterrorism measure, and it requires a long-term commitment, policy 
amendments, and effective law enforcement efforts.
Targeting the Processing Stage
According to this article’s findings, targeting the heroin processing stage is not 
only cost effective, but also a viable option. Compared to other stages in the 
drug trade, this stage is the only one where the product streams converge into 
countable and targetable facilities. Targeting the cultivation, shipment, and 
sales stages requires comparatively more resources than would the destruction 
of the laboratories; so far, these strategies have also proven ineffective, given that 
supplies remain high and prices low at the consumer level. Attacking the pro-
cessing laboratories also substantially reduces both the Taliban’s and the PKK’s 
drug revenues, since it directly affects the rest of the drug trafficking chain.
Through intelligence, the exact locations of the heroin laboratories can be 
traced. The laboratories located within the better-governed zones should be 
targeted with the combined help of local and international law enforcement 
agencies. The main aim of this type of ground raid is to physically destroy the 
labs and make them permanently unusable. The labs located in ungoverned 
zones should be targeted by international coalition air strikes.
Heroin manufacturing requires specific precursor chemicals, which originate 
primarily in Europe. Therefore, there is a strong need for an international 
policy that puts more stringent controls on precursors as dual-use substances. 
These chemicals should be treated in a similar manner to legal drugs that are 
also used for illicit purposes. By stopping the precursors from reaching the 
Targeting the heroin processing 
stage is not only cost effective, 

















Figure 3: Counter-Narcoterrorism Solution Model
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heroin laboratories, the processing stage will become very difficult. In order to 
develop a strategy for seizing illegal shipments of precursors, it will be neces-
sary to identify the agents, and the possible routes and methods of transporta-
tion, and subsequently launch a comprehensive attack against all nodes of 
clandestine precursor shipment. 
Policy Measures
Despite the concentrated efforts of international agencies and governments, 
there is no evidence of success against narcoterrorism. An ongoing program 
run by several international organizations that offers alternative livelihoods 
to farmers should be continued as an effective and long-term narcoterrorism 
countermeasure. This policy decreases the amount of opium yield, which 
reduces the funds going to terrorist organizations. The other strategic effect of 
this policy is to erode much-needed popular support for the Taliban terrorist 
organization. The eradication of poppy crops can be a part of the policy, but 
it must be implemented only in areas that are free of terrorist activities and 
where sufficiently remunerative alternatives are available to the farmers.
Conclusion
This article illustrates the extent to which two terrorist organizations, the 
Taliban and the PKK, raise funds in the five stages of the heroin trade: cultiva-
tion, processing, shipment, sale, and consumption. The Taliban and the PKK 
generate huge amounts of money from the opium trade. The Taliban make 
most of their money from the cultivation, processing, and shipment stages; 
the PKK mostly earn their funds from the shipment and sale of heroin. These 
two terrorist organizations have their peculiar strengths and weaknesses, some 
of which are identified in this article. The identification of weak and poten-
tially vulnerable links between terrorist organizations and drug trafficking can 
help law enforcement, drug control, and financial oversight agencies effec-
tively combat this menace.
The counter-narcoterrorism solution model displays both the convergent and 
divergent stages of the opium trade. The processing stage is the only stage 
where the products converge into countable and targetable laboratories. This 
model demonstrates that targeting the opium-to-heroin processing labora-
tories is not only cost effective, but also reduces both the Taliban’s and PKK’s 
illegal funding streams. This model can be applied to other terrorist organi-
zations and other illicit drugs as a means to identify and reduce the funds 
generated through drug trafficking. 
Lastly, this article does not try to solve drug abuse problems but attempts 
to demonstrate a cost-effective way to reduce the funds received by terrorist 
organizations through illegal drug trafficking. It provides a direction for 
intelligence work, and describes a particularly vulnerable stage at which to 
effectively target narcoterrorism. The question of who, how, and when is open 
for further study.   
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Human Rights as a Weapon of Terrorists: A Case Study
LTC Jorge Galindo Cardenas, 
Colombian Army
Human rights can become a 
weapon to advance obscure 
political movements that 
legitimize violence.
The FARC systematically uses 
the issue of human rights to 
advance its political agenda 
and constrain the state’s 
legitimate use of force.
Human rights are recognized worldwide as a means to protect 
the individual from abuses and to guarantee each and every human being the 
freedom to pursue his own prerogatives.1 The Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen was written in the midst of the French Revolution, 
and was followed by the Declaration of Human Rights issued by the U.N. 
in 1948, shortly after the Second World War. Nowadays, in what we can call 
the “human rights era,” it is almost inconceivable to object to the doctrine of 
human rights. It can often seem, however, as if every question or attempt at 
thoughtful debate on that sensitive issue will be considered by someone to be 
an offense against human rights themselves.
Given the current climate, then, the present article is likely to be considered 
controversial. The intent of this paper is to demonstrate that the doctrine of 
human rights can be misused, even abused, by some groups to advance their 
own agendas. In this context, human rights can become a weapon to advance 
obscure political movements that legitimize violence, limit the ability of the 
state to meet its legitimate obligation of protecting its citizens, and undermine 
the nation’s prestige. I will show how terrorist organizations, like modern 
Robespierres, wave the flag of human rights while mercilessly decapitating 
people with the contemporary guillotine of terrorism.
The case I examine in this article is Colombia, my country of origin, a nation 
that has been dealing with an internal conflict for the past 50 years. I concen-
trate specifically on the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas, 
or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), the terrorist insurgent group 
that has confronted the Colombian government since 1964 in its aim to estab-
lish a revolutionary state founded on Marxist-Leninist principles. The article 
is divided into three main parts: first, a brief orientation to the FARC for the 
unfamiliar reader; second, a description of the actors and the FARC’s strategy; 
and third, an explanation of the ways in which the strategy operates to achieve 
the FARC’s goals. Through this discussion, I demonstrate that the FARC sys-
tematically uses the issue of human rights to achieve three goals: advance its 
political agenda, constrain the state’s legitimate use of force, and undermine 
the image and prestige of the country.
A priori, this article does not aim to dig into the details of the Colombian 
conflict. This long-lasting struggle has gone through many stages involving 
multiple actors, and has caused irreparable damage among Colombia’s popula-
tion, many of whom have been affected by the abuses of the terrorists, and 
sometimes of the government itself.  
Putting the FARC into Historical Context
The FARC traces its roots to the bipartisan struggle known as La Violencia 
(the Violence, 1948–1958), a bitter confrontation between the two traditional 
political parties in Colombia, the Liberal and Conservative parties. The FARC 
63
August 2013 
Despite the opportunity to 
abandon violence, the FARC 
never fully demobilized.
The FARC embraced a 
Marxist-Leninist philosophy of 
protracted class struggle—a 
credo that it still defends.
contends it is the legitimate successor to an organized peasant movement that 
resisted government-led persecution during La Violencia. Although an agree-
ment ended the confrontation between the conflict’s two main factions,2 the 
FARC embraced a Marxist-Leninist philosophy of protracted class struggle—a 
credo that it still defends—and continued to fight against government forces. 
During the 1970s, the FARC pursued the “growing and equilibrium phase” 
of insurgency according to Mao Zedong’s theory of peasant revolution.3 The 
movement reached its peak during the 1980s, in parallel with multiple revo-
lutionary movements throughout Latin America. In 1985, the FARC partially 
accepted a demobilization plan and created a new political party, the Union 
Patriótica (Patriotic Union), which won seats in Congress and occupied 
various government positions. Despite this opportunity to abandon violence, 
the FARC never fully demobilized; the group instead used its political wing to 
further the Marxist principle of combining all forms of struggle.
The end of the Cold War in 1989–1990 had both ideological and economic 
effects on the organization. What limited funding the FARC received from 
Communist bloc countries, primarily the Soviet Union and Cuba, dried up. 
Given the failure of communism as a global political movement and the need 
to alter their ideology and rhetoric accordingly, the FARC’s leaders adopted a 
Bolivarian program, presenting themselves as heirs to the ideas of the Latin 
American liberator Simón Bolívar. Around this time, the FARC also began to 
rely much more heavily on a funding source that it had begun exploiting in 
the 1980s: narco-trafficking.4 
In the late 1980s, the Colombian government, with help from the United 
States, began a campaign to eradicate the big drug cartels. The FARC, which 
initially had taxed coca production and provided protection to farmers and 
smugglers, seized the opportunity to take over a larger share of the country’s 
cocaine trafficking. The FARC had a tempestuous relationship with the Co-
lombian drug cartels. At the beginning of its entry into the narco-trafficking 
business, the FARC formed a partner relationship with some cartels, but it 
eventually became a major competitor. The rivalry resulted in the merciless 
persecution and assassination of political representatives, and the disap-
pearance of the Union Patriótica. The FARC has since become the dominant 
organization in the Colombian cocaine industry.5 Thus, what started out as a 
Marxist-Leninist organization became a narco-trafficking cartel.
The FARC formed a partner 
relationship with some drug 
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Over its history, the terrorist group has joined six failed attempts to achieve a 
peace agreement with the Colombian government. The FARC took advantage 
of these brief respites from combat to increase its military power and number 
of operatives, as well as to gain some international recognition.6 Beginning in 
the early 2000s, with the start of the U.S.-led Global War on Terror and the 
implementation of the Colombian government program called “Democratic 
Security” (2002–2011), the FARC faced its most difficult period to date, losing 
its top leadership and significant numbers of personnel to army operations. 
In late 2012, FARC leaders once again entered peace talks with the Colombian 
government; these talks are ongoing in 2013.7 To put it another way, the 
FARC’s recent significant losses have forced it back to the negotiating table. 
The success of the Democratic Security program rested on the willingness of 
the government to confront the FARC, not only by military means, but also by 
making a decisive effort to bring a positive state presence to the most remote 
parts of the country. It was based on three principles: the expanded pres-
ence of the state, generosity toward demobilized combatants, and a refusal to 
negotiate under threat of violence. This move by the government was different 
from previous attempts to confront the insurgency because it encompassed 
both the military and civilian sectors, while severely restricting the FARC’s 
political space within Colombia and abroad.  
In summary, the FARC is a powerful drug cartel that was militarily decimated 
as an insurgency. It nevertheless remains extremely resilient, despite being gen-
erally unpopular within Colombia (a recent poll gave the group less than 30% 
approval)8 and having very remote prospects for achieving its main ambition 
of overthrowing the government. As a result, the FARC has again refined its 
strategy: it stubbornly persists in all forms of struggle to advance the group’s 
interests, mixing such apparently disparate means as violence and terrorism 
with calls for human rights protections. I explain the motivations and facts 
underlying this assertion in the next section. 
Network and Narrative: The Structure to Advance a 
Political Agenda 
The FARC takes advantage of two basic structures that it uses to manipulate 
human rights as an instrument of its agenda. First is a solid and well-con-
nected personnel infrastructure that I call “the FARC Network,” and second is 
a consistent and repetitive public discourse that I call “the FARC Narrative.” 
With these two elements, the FARC has a high chance of success in achieving 
its intended aims. The FARC has been very resilient throughout its history and 
still pursues its objective of taking political power, either by violence (which 
has only the remotest possibility for success), or by following the Leninist 
principle of combining all forms of struggle—armed, political, and popular. 
This principle is directly relevant to the current analysis.
When the doctrine of human rights comes to mind in our contemporary 
world, it is typically closely associated with nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs). I define the doctrine of human rights here as the insistence 
of many individuals, organizations, and institutions on viewing everything 
they do from the one-sided view of human rights, and using these rights for 
political purposes rather than authentic humanitarian purposes. A “network” 
The FARC’s recent significant 
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encompasses individuals and/or organizations that are mutually linked, and 
their degree of linkage. The FARC Network I am referring to is composed 
mainly of NGOs. I am not arguing that all of these NGOs are sponsored by the 
FARC; rather, what I do claim is that these organizations have been skillfully 
utilized by the FARC to serve its murky and self-serving interests and that, 
intentionally or not, a number of NGOs have been effective instruments in 
accomplishing some of the FARC’s goals. 
Although the exact number of human rights-oriented NGOs operating in 
Colombia is hard to pin down, it is possible to describe the distribution across 
multiple social groups, covering a diverse range of activities. Some examples 
are the Comisión Colombiana de Juristas (Colombian Commission of Jurists) 
and the Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear (José Alvear Lawyers’ Collective), 
both of which act to influence the Colombian 
judiciary. In the agricultural area, there are 
multiple associations, the most representative of 
which is the Agencia de Prensa Rural (Rural Press 
Agency). Indian communities are represented by 
the CRIC (Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca, or 
Indian Regional Council of the Cauca), among 
others. Many NGOs with suggestive names 
occupy prominent positions in the sociopolitical 
arena: CODHES (Consultoría para los Derechos 
Humanos y el Desplazamiento, Consultancy for 
Human Rights and Displacement), MOVICE 
(Movimiento Nacional de Víctimas de Crímenes de 
Estado, National Movement of Victims of State 
Crimes), Comité de Solidaridad con los Presos 
Políticos (Committee in Solidarity with Political 
Prisoners), and the recently created Marcha 
Patriótica (Patriotic March). Even religion is 
included in this myriad of groups, through the 
Comisión Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz (Inter-
Ecclesiastical Commission for Justice and Peace). 
This “FARC Network” is not limited to NGOs 
within Colombia’s borders; rather, it expands 
abroad to multiple organizations in different countries, such as the France-
based FIDH (Federación Internacional de los Derechos Humanos, the Interna-
tional Federation of Human Rights), the Denmark-based Asociación Rebelión 
(Rebellion Association), and the Britain-based Justice for Colombia, among 
others. The organizations listed here are merely a small sample of the ex-
panded links of organizations that are used to serve the purposes of the FARC. 
I will address the activities and effects of these groups later in this article. 
The other part of the strategy for advancing the insurgents’ interests is the 
“FARC Narrative,” which characterizes the FARC as a rebel group representing 
a segment of the population historically forgotten by the government and 
subject to isolation, poverty, and harassment. This narrative is a two-way 
exercise intended to legitimize the terrorist group while delegitimizing the 
state. The NGOs within the “FARC Network” legitimate the terrorist group by 
lending credibility to the “FARC Narrative”:  they often describe its members 
as “Robin Hoods” stealing from the rich to give to the poor; moreover, the 
A number of NGOs have 
been effective instruments 
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FARC’s terrorist actions are presented as consequences of the legitimate defense 
of the oppressed against the oppressors, the necessary antecedent to reach 
“social justice.”9 This rhetoric has remained almost unchanged over time, 
and was even augmented when the recent peace talks started, in a bid for the 
publicity that the organization needs to be considered as a legitimate political 
actor rather than a drug cartel or terrorist group. 
Nothing, however, could be further from reality than the “FARC Narrative.” 
The FARC, which is overwhelmingly rejected by the Colombian population, 
is an organization dedicated to narco-trafficking, with only a thin veneer 
remaining of its original Marxist-Leninist ideology. It is also a terrorist group 
guilty of the most despicable crimes: people kidnapped and held captive in 
the jungle for decades, unarmed civilians attacked and murdered, hundreds of 
Colombians mutilated or killed with anti-per-
sonal mines, and innocent children murdered.10 
To minimize attention to such atrocities, some 
NGOs prefer to call the people kidnapped by 
the FARC “retained” rather than “hostages”; 
they use the sophism of “sociopolitical 
conflict” to refer to the terrorist threat posed 
by the FARC, and they use the term “political 
prisoners” to refer to FARC operatives convicted 
of terrorist attacks. It is also remarkable that 
all of these organizations remain silent towards 
the FARC’s terrorist attacks, giving the impres-
sion that they do not support human rights for 
victims of the FARC’s attacks, even if they are 
unarmed civilians. 
In the same way, the narrative seeks to dele-
gitimize the government by presenting it as a 
quasi-dictatorship, and Colombia as an op-
pressive state where there is no democracy, and 
where state security forces commit systematic 
violations of human rights. This disinforma-
tion is used to justify the bloody resistance to a 
“dirty war as a strategy of the terrorism of the 
state.”11 The truth is quite the opposite: Colombia is a stable democracy, and 
the government is committed to human rights. Vice President of the Republic 
Angelino Garzón promotes the cause of human rights, civilian and judiciary 
institutions exercise tight control over the military, and there is an extensive 
and comprehensive training program on human rights for government 
officials, especially military personnel. Finally, contrary to the claims of “state 
terrorism,” protection of human rights is actually exaggerated, a situation 
that unfortunately allows radical groups such as the FARC and sympathizing 
NGOs to undermine the exercise of state authority. Often the complaints and 
accusations made by NGOs against the military are accepted as facts by the 
populace without investigation, and can violate the basic rights that military 
personnel should have to defense. Moreover, multiple institutions monitor the 
Colombian armed forces’ behavior, including the attorney general’s office, the 
general prosecutor’s office, military tribunals, the congress, and international 
institutions, as well as domestic and foreign NGOs. 
Some NGOs prefer to 
call the people kidnapped 
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Operationalizing the Instrument: Undermining and 
Constraining the State
The enemies of peace and order in Colombia spare no effort in their attempts 
to impose limitations on the state. Max Weber defined the state as a “human 
community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within 
a territory.”12 The FARC, aware of this definition, uses human rights as an 
instrument to deny this legitimate use of force to the state, converting human 
rights from something to be respected into a “tool” or “weapon” to advance its 
terrorist agenda.
The first step in this process is to constrain the legitimate use of force through 
a cluster of denunciations at the regional and international level. The FARC’s 
modus operandi seems to be “one operation, one denunciation.” After almost 
every military operation, there is a judicial complaint levied by the FARC 
against the Colombian military: excessive use of force, indiscriminate 
shooting,13 harassment and intimidation,14 illegal detentions,15 extrajudicial 
executions,16 indiscriminate bombing,17 and so forth. While it is undeniable 
that some members of the military have committed abuses and violations, 
these have been isolated cases and are not systematic conduct by military 
forces as many NGOs often claim. 
The intent of this barrage of accusations is to paralyze military operations, 
demoralize the troops, and bring about the often unfair imprisonment of mili-
tary personnel. An emblematic case is that of Colonel (Ret.) Alfonso Plazas 
Vegas, who in 1985 led an operation to retake control of the Hall of Justice 
from the rebel force M-19, who were rumored to be working on behalf of the 
infamous drug lord Pablo Escobar. Plazas was a national hero at that time, 
but more than 25 years later, he is facing a sentence of 30 years in jail for the 
“forced disappearances” of civilians who were captured during the operation.18 
Even worse, this crime did not exist in Colombian law in 1985, the year when 
the events took place. 
Another case further illustrates the situation. David Ravelo Crespo, a member 
of one of these multiple NGOs, was arrested in 2010 and accused of partici-
pating in the 1991 homicide of a politician.19 Multiple NGOs describe Ravelo 
as a political prisoner and his situation as an example of political persecu-
tion.20 These kinds of denunciations distract the state’s attention from legiti-
mate matters, and undermine its image both within Colombia and abroad. 
Additional evidence of this tactic—the misuse of NGOs—was obtained from 
the computer of “Raul Reyes” (an alias), a top leader of the FARC who was 
killed in a military operation carried out by the Colombian Army in 2008. 
The Reyes files mention Renacer (Revive), an NGO that was founded in Ven-
ezuela by the FARC to “protect the human rights of the significant number of 
Colombian refugees living in the border areas”.21 Emails exchanged between 
terrorist leaders point out how, parallel to the denunciation of the Colombian 
government, the organization also provided medical assistance, identification 
documents, and easy access to Venezuela for the members of the FARC.22 
There can be economic interests linked to the promotion of human rights 
as well. For instance, in 2012 public opinion in Colombia was astonished by 
news that one of the alleged plaintiffs in a notorious case of human rights 
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violation known as the Mapiripan massacre was exposed as a fraud. In 2005, 
an illegal paramilitary force raided the remote village of Mapiripan, allegedly 
killing at least 49 people. Relatives of the victims received millions of dollars 
from the government in compensation, and an Army general was imprisoned, 
accused of “omission” because the massacre occurred without military inter-
vention. One of the beneficiaries, Mariela Contreras, later revealed that she 
was pressured by the NGO Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear, whose lawyers 
were representing her, to testify at a hearing of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights that her husband and two sons were killed the night of the 
raid. Contreras confessed that one of her sons went missing years before the 
massacre, the other had been recruited by the FARC, and her husband had 
been killed by members of the FARC, all before the paramilitary incursion. In 
return for her false testimony, she and her family had received a considerable 
amount of money, which she then shared with the Colectivo.23 Currently, the 
Colombian government is investigating the facts of the massacre again to 
ascertain whether the numbers of people allegedly killed was further inflated.
There can be obscure interests behind the apparent good will of these human 
rights defenders. Many of these organizations, skillfully manipulated by 
the FARC, not only delegitimize, constrain, and undermine the state, they 
also sometimes receive significant financial dividends from the process. The 
inevitable outcome of this “symbiotic” relationship between the FARC and 
some NGOs is the weakening of the state and the advance of the FARC terrorist 
agenda that lies behind the scenes.
The previous cases are just a small sample of the systematic abuses that NGOs 
commit under the banner of human rights—abuses that ultimately favor the 
FARC and undermine the state’s legitimate right and obligation to protect its 
citizens. The well-configured FARC Network and the persistent FARC Narra-
tive are key components of the group’s strategy to ensure its own survival and 
perhaps defeat the state in the political arena. This situation, although specific 
to Colombia, contains elements that are useful for understanding similar 
situations in other countries that face terrorists. A “network” of sympathizing 
NGOs that assist the terrorist group and a “narrative” that is echoed by seem-
ingly independent and therefore more credible organizations are likely to exist 
in other situations and contexts.24 
As we consider this phenomenon of the misuse and abuse of human rights by 
terrorist organizations, we must remember that the doctrine of human rights 
is just that—human, not divine. Thus, those who champion it can be fallible 
and far from perfect themselves. Baseless accusations of human rights viola-
tions made by terrorist organizations and their supporting network against the 
Colombian government should be viewed skeptically, with the understanding 
that perhaps such accusations are part of a larger strategy by the FARC to take 
advantage of the ideas, concepts, and laws behind human rights for its own 
self-serving purposes.   
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This interview is taken from the collection of the Combating 
Terrorism Archive Project.1 LTC Kashif Jamal Khan, Pakistani Air Force, 
spoke on 6 May 2013 with LTC Ramey Wilson, U.S. Army, about LTC 
Wilson’s career as a military medical officer.2
LTC KHAN: How did you become involved with military medicine?
LTC WILSON: Before I went to medical school, I was actually a field artillery 
officer. I spent four years as a field artillery officer and led individuals at the 
small unit level. I really enjoyed being with soldiers, but also preparing for 
battle—this is in the mid-’90s so we (the United States) didn’t have any big 
conflicts going on in that time period. I come from a medical family. I went 
to the Uniformed Services University, which is the Department of Defense 
medical school in Washington, D.C. It has a mission to train not only physi-
cians but also offers advanced education for nurses and conducts research 
focused on the practice of medicine in a military environment. So that is how 
I got into it. The Uniformed Services University is just like any other medical 
school that is accredited. It also has a special military curriculum to prepare 
its future physicians to operate in a military environment. So that is how I 
became a military physician.  
Then I went on to do my training in our military treatment facilities at 
Walter Reed Army Medical Center, and my residency in internal medi-
cine. I finished medical school in 2002, and then I was a resident until 
2005. So I was at Walter Reed during the beginning of the Afghanistan 
war and the Iraq war. Having both the military experience as well as the 
medical military curriculum really gave me—when I was taking care of 
patients at Walter Reed, many of whom had just been on the battlefield 
18 to 20 hours beforehand—a better understanding of the conditions 
that my patients were facing. 
LTC KHAN: Keeping your experience in mind, how do you think 
military medicine is different from regular medicine?
LTC WILSON: That is a good question, because I think that difference 
is a part of military medicine that is often underappreciated. If you 
think about how we practice medicine in general, we practice in a kind 
of network made up of different actors and roles, all playing a part in 
providing good medical care to different types of patients based upon 
illnesses or disease processes or accidents or whatever. It takes nurses, it 
takes doctors, it takes surgeons, it takes OB/GYNs to deliver babies, to 
create that full spectrum—a medical network. You have to be able to 
draw upon all facets of it. 






If you think about how 
we practice medicine in 
general, we practice in a 
kind of network made up of 
different actors and roles.
Now in military medicine, we are going to take a large group of people and 
displace them from their normal situation, and ask them to go and practice 
medicine in what is often a very austere environment, usually riddled with 
insecurity. Those are often the areas where medical development is not as 
pronounced because of the lack of security, or because it is hard to get people 
to go practice medicine in those areas. When military personnel get injured, 
you need to have medical people there who can operate in those austere envi-
ronments, who understand—from the point of injury all the way back to the 
United States—that some care is appropriate at some levels and not at others 
in terms of stabilizing and moving patients. A lot of it has to do with that 
interface between the traditional medical facility, like a big hospital and doc-
tors’ offices, and the warfighter who is out there often in very austere, remote, 
dangerous places. In general, if a military person is injured, say on the battle-
field, they can’t just pick up their phone and call the civilian ambulance—who 
would they call? So the U.S. military develops and resources not only the 
people but also the technology to move forward and extend the reach of its 
own healthcare system all the way to the battlefield. We do that at different 
levels: we have medics who are trained to operate with the soldiers on the 
ground. We have physicians and assistants who staff forward aid stations, and 
we have echelons of care where patients are brought through increasing levels 
of capability and technology as they move back towards the medical treatment 
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facility. So, one of the unique challenges for military medical personnel, I 
think, is being able to operate in austere environments.  
Another unique kind of component is how military medical support has to 
be integrated into the operational plan. The military physicians and those 
who are operating at that interface are making the bridge between the place of 
war and the hospital, and they have to be able to integrate that medical care 
within the operations that are taking place. A lot of times there is a lack 
of security in their area as well, so those medical resources, even though they 
are protected under the Geneva Convention, have to be protected from at-
tackers. There is that aspect of it: being able to work in austere environments, 
being able to integrate with the military operations, but then also being able 
to take the technology and the knowledge that we know and apply it in situa-
tions that are less than ideal. And you know, it can be challenging.  
LTC KHAN: Keeping in view what you have covered, the difference between 
the military medical system and regular medicine, what do you think is the 
role of military healthcare? You have touched upon it, so could you elaborate 
on it? 
LTC WILSON: Sure. A good way to think about it is the motto of the Army 
medical system, which is “To conserve the fighting strength.” There are a 
couple of different facets of the motto that are important. Obviously, when we 
have patients who are injured in fighting, our role is to take care of them. But 
another component of that is preventive medicine. Conserving the fighting 
strength means not only saving the lives and repairing the injuries of those 
who are hurt, but also trying to keep people from getting injured or sick. 
If you look at the history of modern warfare, especially from the past 100 years, 
more people have had to be removed from the battlefield due to non-battle 
injuries than from fighting-related injuries. Diseases, mainly infectious 
diseases, draw away the fighting strength of the force available for the security 
mission or operations. So a big aspect of military medicine is the preven-
tion of disease: basic hygiene, basic sanitation, reducing the medical health 
threats that those soldiers are going to face in different areas. Often those 
areas have climates that are significantly different from the U.S., and harbor 
diseases we don’t see normally in the U.S. We see this commonly, and it is one 
of the reasons why the U.S. military has been so aggressive in its infectious 
disease research, such as with malaria. We don’t really have a big problem 
with malaria in the U.S., but in a lot of the places where we operate, malaria 
is endemic. If you go back to the career of Walter Reed, who our hospital is 
named for, understanding the etiology and the causes of yellow 
fever during the building of the Panama Canal was a big part of 
military medicine. The fighting strength was those workers and 
military personnel who were helping build the Panama Canal. 
Yellow fever had been a big impediment to that development in 
the past.  
From the tactical perspective, the United States has an ethical 
contract with our soldiers that says: Hey, if we are going to put 
you in harm’s way and something bad happens to you, we have 
a responsibility to take care of you. If the soldiers don’t have 
confidence in that medical care, I think you are going to see the 
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willingness of people to put themselves at risk decrease. They are going to 
modify their behavior, be less willing to take risks. A lot of times it is that very 
risk that is needed in order to secure peace or establish peace in the conflict 
area. So to me, that is one of the key aspects of military medicine. The other 
aspect, as I mentioned before, is maintaining the force, and taking a preventative-
medicine, public-health approach to a very austere environment, to try to 
keep people from getting sick so that they can focus on fighting rather than 
worrying about having to relieve themselves every 20 minutes or something 
like that.  
LTC KHAN: What different types of training have you received to learn this 
military medicine outside of regular medicine?
LTC WILSON: As I mentioned earlier, the medical school that I went to has 
a specific curriculum that is designed for military medicine. But you know, 
not all military physicians go to the medical school that I went to. Many go 
to regular medical schools and then are brought into the Army. The military 
helps pay for their medical education with the expectation that they will 
then serve a certain number of years in the Army as a physician. In the Army 
specifically— the Navy and the Air Force have similar programs—during your 
medical school training, either in the summers or after your training, you go 
through professional education courses, like the leadership courses that teach 
the skills of tactical medical care. Most of that in the U.S. Army is centered at 
Fort Sam Houston, Texas, which is where the Army Military Medical Depart-
ment Center and School is located. That is where we train all our medics and 
so all military physicians will go there.
The Army also offers some specialized training, such as a course on medical 
management of chemical and biological warfare. We have specific courses for 
people who don’t do a lot of trauma in the hospital but who are going to be 
deployed to support a forward unit in combat, to improve their trauma and 
resuscitation skills. A lot of that is built upon the civilian Advanced Trauma 
Life Support Course.  
In the last 10 years, as we have been fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, there 
has been a deliberate effort to codify what really makes a difference on the 
battlefield. That knowledge has been codified into what we call TCCC, or 
Tactical Combat Casualty Care. The TCCC concept has permeated tactical 
medical care. For example, the first aid kit that every soldier carries is de-
signed specifically on TCCC principles. The whole idea is that there are certain 
things that need to be done right. Soldiers need to be prepared to provide 
that treatment at the point of injury, such as for loss of an airway, or to stop 
bleeding. This training can really change survivability at the point of injury 
and allow soldiers to get back to more intensive care. So there are a lot of 
courses that teach and prepare our soldiers and medical personnel as part of 
their military education. 
A lot of the training has to do with tactical medical care, and I think one of 
the things that we need to do better is integrating ourselves into military op-
erations: physicians seeing themselves as part of the unit and looking at how 
they can better use the medical resources in the unit to support the mission’s 
objectives. 
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LTC KHAN: Keeping in view the 2012 national security strategy, which states 
that the U.S. is going to go for smaller operations and more partnerships, 
how, in your opinion, will this change military medical care?
LTC WILSON: I think that is a really good question. Most of our previous doc-
trine was based on fighting a large, land-based, conventional fight. Because of 
that, our medical doctrine has been one of care on a linear battlefield: There 
is a definite front line and a definite rear, and the further you get away from 
the front line, the more secure it becomes. As you evacuate patients to the 
rear, they can get better levels of care because each stop along the way back 
to the hospital has more resources. In Afghanistan, we had more of a non-
contiguous battlefield where there wasn’t necessarily a front line anywhere. 
When you are fighting an insurgency, the regular doctrine of echelon care 
doesn’t necessarily apply. We have had to really adapt. Because our doctrine 
drives our manning and our resources, we have had to take the resources that 
we have based upon the previous doctrine and use some creativity in order to 
provide better care. For example, when I was in Afghanistan in 2007 to 2008, 
we had to split our aid station into two pieces, with myself at one base and 
my physician assistant at another. But we also had three satellite fire bases that 
were manned by only one platoon of infantry. A platoon of infantry usually 
has one medic. We could reach one of them only by helicopter, and if the 
weather was bad, they were completely isolated. So that is where you need to 
have some creativity and look at what are the risks, what are things that we 
can do to mitigate that situation. 
I am a big believer in rehearsals, and I am also a big believer in doing mis-
sion analysis before deployment, because when someone is injured, that is 
not the time to ask, “Hey, what do we need to do?” You need to be running 
through those problem sets before they actually happen on the ground. You 
train your medics so that they can do more than just put on a tourniquet and 
stop bleeding. You teach them to treat muscular-skeletal injuries and basic 
non-battle injuries. You need to make sure you have good communication 
plans. Now one of the ways we mitigate that risk is our aerial medevac system. 
We don’t rely on ground medevac in Afghanistan because of the terrain. 
But there are times where aerial medevac has been denied or is not available 
because of weather, so you have to think about that before and take actions 
to mitigate that. The national security strategy is focusing more on having a 
light footprint, so—especially in the realm of special operations and counter-
insurgency—we are going to have small units operating outside the reach of 
an aerial medevac system. I think the way we are going to have to mitigate the 
medical risks is through partnership with the host nation. The alternative is 
that everywhere we go, we have to put a big medical footprint, and that is just 
not consistent with the strategy moving forward. 
You are there in general to develop a partnership with the host nation. Well, 
part of that is to strengthen the medical systems of our partners. By doing 
that, I think we can develop interoperability but also provide some protection 
for our forces that are operating in other countries by making the medical 
systems of the host country stronger.  
LTC KHAN: Can you specify what type of partnership you think is needed? 
Like providing care, or providing education to the partner countries? Or what 
specific area do you think is important?
When you are fighting an 
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LTC WILSON: Well, I think we are doing this pretty well at the tactical ground 
level, whether it be special operation medics or even general purpose force 
medics. When they partner with a host country unit, there is a lot of good 
teaching and training going on. A lot of it is based on the TCCC principles I 
mentioned before, on how to provide good unit injury care. I think there can 
be improvement in providing treatment at levels above that. Like I mentioned 
before, medical care is done in a network or a system. So that is great if our 
partners have medics on the ground to take care of injuries right away and 
prevent death at the point of injury, but the medics then need to have some-
where to send those patients. They need to have surgical capabilities; they 
need to have physicians who know how to treat those types of injuries; there 
needs to be a chain of care going back to definitive care at a hospital. I think 
that is an area where we can really partner a lot better, by developing both the 
education and the training aspects of our partner systems. We can show that 
there is value in this. It is not just developing medical capability in general but 
having it focused specifically on supporting the security forces. 
We can say, “Oh yes, that is great. We are going to help build the military 
health system.” But I would encourage people to think even beyond that. 
Think of it as not just the military but security forces in general, because if 
you are talking about police forces or local security forces, you can’t neces-
sarily build a military medical system that is going to cover partner forces all 
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over the country. And so a lot of times, those host nation security forces are 
going to need to go to the local civilian clinics where they are already being 
served. I know some people consider this controversial in terms of the military 
partnering with civilian healthcare systems to strengthen them, but I think 
it makes a lot of sense as long as when we do it, we keep our focus on doing 
things that are actually going to impact security.3 
There has been a lot of debate and discussion in the last five to ten years about 
the use of soft power and the use of medical diplomacy. I think there is a place 
for that, and we are already doing it in a lot of places, especially looking at 
pandemic flu outbreaks and weapons of mass destruction. We are working 
with ministries of health of different countries on their reaction program to 
pandemic flu, for example. I think that everyone realizes that if we ever have 
a flu pandemic, the risk will be everywhere. If health ministries are able to 
take care of their own area, then we can manage the outbreak in general. If 
everyone is looking to the U.S. or the World Health Organization to manage 
an outbreak, it will spread too fast and become too big of a problem for us 
to control. So I think the U.S. has a role in strengthening the other country’s 
civilian healthcare system, but we haven’t had a good focus on what exactly 
we are trying to do. Our work has bled into the priorities of, for example, the 
Ministry of Health as opposed to making sure those interventions actually 
support the U.S. Department of the Interior or Defense by directly teaching 
and developing those capabilities to support security forces.  
I think, at the end of the day, we have different pillars of development. Security 
is the primary role of the military—to help establish and maintain security 
in the region. No other development can happen in an unsecured area. What 
the international organizations want, what non-governmental organizations 
want, is a secure environment into which they can go and do development. 
So if that is our armed forces’ primary role, there is a need and a requirement 
to have good medical support for all security forces. That gives us a well-
defined mandate to go in and work with the civilian medical system. A lot of 
the criticism we get comes when we try to do things that non-governmental 
organizations want to be doing with the host country’s internal healthcare. 
I am not saying that is not important, and in some places that may be the 
biggest medical need in the area. But I think we have to take a larger view and 
say, okay, the way that need is ultimately going to be met in the long run is to 
develop security. So we need to make sure that the security forces are effec-
tive, and I think, especially in areas of low security or high risk, having good 
medical care available for those security forces is going to help them establish 
that security the quickest, which will then allow other organizations to come 
in and take over the wider medical care role. We have limited resources, too, 
so if we focus on things outside of security, then security may suffer and then 
the whole thing suffers. I think by focusing first on security, we can help set 
the conditions for the improvement of the system overall.  
The challenge is that a lot of times, the Ministry of Health officials are focused 
on what their greatest needs are, so we don’t necessarily want to go in and 
tell them what they should be doing. When your death rate for children is very 
high, when women are dying in childbirth, that is a real need and can have defi-
nite impacts on the future and economic development of that country. But, I 
think part of our role is to help them also see that medical care is needed for 
security. I feel very strongly that one of the main roles of military medicine is 
to develop medical care for internal security forces.4
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LTC KHAN: My last question is regarding your recent study, done at NPS, on 
military medical care. Can you share some of your analyses or some of your 
thoughts on your study? What were your findings, and what did you propose 
for military healthcare where U.S. forces are operating?
LTC WILSON: A lot of what I have just been talking about springs from my 
own training and experience, and what I observed in Afghanistan for two 
years. It really echoes what I have just mentioned. The U.S. military should 
focus on developing host country healthcare to support the indigenous 
security force. I think the first step is to ask what things are we doing already 
to develop as opposed to provide healthcare, and focus more on the security 
aspect of it. My thesis specifically tried to answer the question, Does the 
quality of medical care impact the effectiveness of security forces?5 The answer 
was very clear. Yes, there is a direct benefit to strengthening security, but there 
are also secondary benefits that can come from focusing first on developing 
the medical system for partners’ security forces.
Different places have different models for their military. Whether you have 
a conscription service for your security force or volunteer service, providing 
good, competent medical care helps with recruitment and retention of the 
security forces. One of the problems that we have seen among Afghan forces 
is that there is a lot of turnover. If you are always training new recruits, you 
are not able to develop that core mid-grade officer, mid-grade noncommis-
sioned officer, the kind of people who stay in the military for a while. Having 
that military medical care as a benefit can help with retention, which is a 
secondary benefit. To me, this concept echoes a lot of the spirit of the national 
security strategy, which states that we are going to strengthen our partners so 
that they can take care of themselves. Obviously this medical support would 
have to be tempered and modified for whichever country we are going into. 
In some ways, our partners are building an institution that is bridging the gap 
between medical care and security forces. This can then be leveraged by the 
state to help itself, to protect and extend healthcare to areas that are maybe 
too insecure for the civilian medical system to go into. You could look at 
the region as well. One country’s capable, forward-looking military medical 
system could be used to assist its regional neighbors, or used internationally 
as part of peacekeeping forces. Such a system also decreases the amount of re-
quirements from other countries, or it increases the total pool of medical folks 
that could be used as part of international responses, whether it be complex 
operations or humanitarian assistance. But the only way I think you are going 
to gain this larger benefit is by working together and developing interoper-
ability. That isn’t easy. As one of my mentors once told me, “Anything worth 
doing is hard because if it was easy it would have already been done.”  
If we take this perspective that medical care for security forces is an important 
part of security building, and overlay that with what it takes to provide good 
tactical medical care as a system, we have all these different touch points for 
partnership. When you look at the skills and the human capital needed to 
maintain, operate, and grow a partner’s medical system, the U.S. has that 
capacity in our military medical systems and our medical education program. 
We also have a large number of military physicians who have a lot of combat 
experience working in conflict zones—experience that can be shared. 
But I think it would be a mistake to say that U.S. military medical staff 
have something to offer that nobody else has. When you talk about what 
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partnership means, it means that we learn from each other and that we do it 
together. Not only do militaries have different capabilities and experiences 
that others can learn from, the same is true in medicine as well. I like to say 
that good medicine is good medicine no matter who is practicing it. A lot of 
times, it is just the clinical application of knowledge that is lacking and how 
you apply that in a military context or security context. But the ability to 
partner at all these different levels, I think, is an opportunity that has been 
missed up to this point. The most current U.S. national security strategy, 
which is directing U.S. military forces to pursue small, light-footprint ap-
proaches, should stimulate us to develop those partnerships because we are 
going to rely on our partners to help provide medical coverage to our forces 
that are taking part in these light-footprint approaches.  
LTC KHAN: Can you say something about training?  
LTC WILSON: I think we missed a great opportunity. Every time we do a 
military exercise, medical response needs to be an integral part of that exercise. 
One of the challenges I think we have in the U.S. is that the military tactical 
side of medicine is relatively separate from civilian medical education and 
training. So finding touch points on institutional levels, whether it be medical 
school to medical school or hospital to hospital, and developing partnerships, 
as well as making those medical partnerships an important aspect of training 
exercises, could help build that partnership and interoperability. I think that is 
the big stuff.
LTC KHAN: Thank you very much. That was wonderful.  
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If you’re reading this column, odds are you’re involved to some 
degree in the service and defense of your country. The odds are even better 
that as a result of your service, you’re presumed to be a man or woman of high 
personal ethics. In most cases, that will be the default expectation, but there 
are, of course, exceptions. For example, I know a lawyer who contends that 
because of collusion and coterie, the police in his hometown are little more 
than “the best-armed gang”—but by and large, I believe those who serve and 
protect, be they military, homeland security, law enforcement, or national 
defense, are generally perceived to be individuals who possess high personal 
moral standards. 
More importantly, I believe that individuals such as yourselves are fully 
expected to draw on and, when necessary, act on those high personal morals 
and ethics in a time of crisis. That, I suggest, is the deal. In situations where 
the majority of society would cave under the pressure or temptation to do 
“the wrong thing,” those of you who serve to protect and defend are expected 
to embrace your personal ethics and pick the harder path. You’re expected to 
choose the action or take the moral stand that accords not only with general 
societal expectations, but also with your own keenly developed personal 
moral standard. That’s why you’re often regarded as heroes, entrusted with 
badges, weapons, the uniforms of your Service and the sacred responsibility of 
protecting innocents. Realistically, though, I submit that actually taking such 
a strong, personal, ethical stance is far, far easier said than done, even for the 
finest among you who are reading this column.
I say that because I believe there is a competing set of ethics that individuals 
serving to defend and protect their society and country must confront and 
perhaps resist, prior ever to taking an ethical stance of their own. This set in-
volves an organization’s own pervasive system of ethics. In times of crisis, most 
individuals who serve will find that the ethics of their organization strongly 
compete for supremacy over any system of personal ethics. The reasoning 
behind that competition comes in the form of at least three classic arguments. 
The first I’ll call the Collective argument because it argues for steadfast loyalty 
to the wisdom of the collective over individual conscience. Or, as more than 
one U.S. Special Forces captain has told me, “When you sign your name on 
the dotted line of your contract to serve, you surrender certain personal rights. 
Among them is the right to pass moral judgment on what you are asked or 
ordered to do.” In my experience, this is not an uncommon opinion. Most 
of us, I think, can accept the fact that, as Richard Miller succinctly points 
out, “Individuals who consent, tacitly or explicitly, to join the military waive 
their rights to life and liberty.”1 It’s reasonable then to suggest that for some 
individuals, such a waiver of rights, by extension, also includes the right to 
pass moral judgment on orders, directives, missions, actions, and the like. And 
while this line of reasoning is definitely not universal among those who serve, 
from my observation, it exists to some measure across all branches, Services, 
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and agencies. For example, Roger Collier, senior editor of the Canadian 
Medical Journal, recognizes there are those in service who “argue that people 
surrender certain personal rights when they join a military, and that the 
mission of the collective trumps the rights of the individual.”2 The problem I 
have with such reasoning is that it’s not accurate, at least not when it comes to 
ethics. There are limits to the legitimacy of an order or a mission, and officers 
and leaders in the service of their countries are expected to recognize and 
respect those limits at all times, regardless of whether they penned their name 
to a obligating contract.
This leads us to the second argument in favor of subjugating one’s personal 
ethics to those of the organization, which we can call the Effectiveness argu-
ment. This idea, which bears a close resemblance to J. Carl Ficarrotta’s “Func-
tional Line,”3 says that the organization couldn’t possibly function effectively 
if everyone reserved the right to filter every order or mission or action through 
his or her own personal set of ethics. As one U.S. Navy SEAL officer evoca-
tively remarked to me, “Sir, we can’t have everyone charging a hill with their 
weapon in one hand and their copy of Rousseau or Mill in the other, checking 
to see if the charge is morally justifiable.” This officer is suggesting that for the 
sake of the mission and the safety of everyone involved, there comes a point 
when, even in light of strong personal doubt, individual ethics have to take a 
back seat to the common values of the organization. And for the record, I buy 
that argument to some extent—I get that personal ethics and organizational 
ethics are not always going to be in sync. As Davis Brown writes,
There is an inherent tension between these two dimensions of 
military ethics. On one hand, good order and discipline within 
a military organization is essential to its success at the tactical, 
operational, and strategic levels. Military success depends on com-
manders being able to rely on their subordinates to follow their 
orders, and also on the subordinates being able to rely on each 
other for mutual protection and support.4
My problem, though, is that this reasoning can lead to the presumption that 
during a time of high stress or crisis, one is permitted—even expected—to 
mute one’s ethical conscience and extend carte blanche approval to any order, 
regardless of its consequences, for the sake of unit cohesion and tactical, 
operational, or strategic success. I believe that such acquiescence ethically is 
not justifiable, even for the sake of success, and Brown himself quickly adds,
… the old adage “I was just following orders” has rationalized too 
many tragedies in military history. Individual military members 
must also be able to discern when the facts on the ground are such 
that blindly following orders would actually impede success—or 
worse, constitute a manifest violation of the law of armed conflict.5
Admittedly, such discernment is often difficult, particularly with regard to 
the third classic argument for suspending moral judgment that is, in essence, 
an amalgam of the previous two. I’ll call this the Greater Strategy argument. 
It asserts that since one can never be sure that the order or mission in ques-
tion isn’t part of a greater strategic plan designed by more knowledgeable 
and, presumably, wiser superiors—a plan that a doubting subordinate may 
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be completely unaware of—the best and most loyal response is to fulfill the 
order or mission to the very best of one’s abilities in order to meet the strategic 
vision. In doing so, the subordinate officer trusts that those higher in the 
chain of command have a firm grip on the ethical necessity and justification 
for the action ordered. My problem with this reasoning, however, is that it’s 
open-ended and completely exculpatory. By implication, at virtually every 
level of command from captain to commander, one may simply choose to 
ignore personal ethics and execute orders on the presumption that those above 
are privy to a greater strategic vision or plan. Such thinking I find ethically 
dangerous. As Stanley Milgram warned over 40 years ago,   
The most far-reaching consequence is that the person feels respon-
sible to the authority directing him but feels no responsibility for 
the content of the actions that the authority prescribes. Morality 
does not disappear—it acquires a radically different focus: the sub-
ordinate person feels shame or pride depending on how adequately 
he has performed the actions called for by authority.6
Interestingly, Milgram also added,
The most frequent defense of the individual who has performed a 
heinous act under command of authority is that he has simply done 
his duty. In asserting this defense, the individual is not introducing 
an alibi concocted for the moment but is reporting honestly on 
the psychological attitude induced by submission to authority.
For a person to feel responsible for his actions, he must sense that 
the behavior has flowed from “the self.”7
What I’m suggesting here is that if one sees his or her actions flowing from 
a greater strategic vision, it may be difficult to also see one’s personal ethical 
responsibility for those same actions. In that case, in the competition between 
organizational ethics and personal ethics, the organization will have won.
Unfortunately, though, such victories are short-lived and often bittersweet 
for the individuals involved. The reality is that while a command structure or 
“collective” may be held morally accountable for certain policies and subse-
quent actions or atrocities,8 the individuals involved in those actions are rarely 
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absolved of culpability. In fact, holding individuals morally responsible for 
their actions in warfare is by now a historical given. As Neta Crawford notes, 
“The notion of individual responsibility of both perpetrators and commanders 
was developed over several centuries in both European and American treaty 
and domestic law and is no longer disputed.”9
So where does this leave you if you’re a member of an organization or agency 
or branch of service engaged in defending and protecting your society? It 
leaves you with the reality that you can align your loyalties to the organiza-
tion or collective, and you can subscribe to the ethics of that Service, but at 
the same time, you can never entirely avoid being held accountable for your 
actions if they depart from your own ethical standards. You can’t sign that 
accountability away on a contractual line, nor can you excuse your account-
ability because the mission or greater strategy required you to act contrary to 
your own conscience. In other words, despite the pressures and arguments 
from your organization, you’re still expected to be a moral individual “who 
must act responsibly in making ultimate moral judgments.”10 As I said at the 
beginning, it’s not an easy trick. But bottom line: it is the one you’re expected 
to pull off.  
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